













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Enhancing Physical Layer Security in Wireless
Networks with Cooperative Approaches
Weigang Liu
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The University of Edinburgh.
June 21, 2016
Abstract
Motivated by recent developments in wireless communication, this thesis aims to
characterize the secrecy performance in several types of typical wireless networks.
Advanced techniques are designed and evaluated to enhance physical layer security in
these networks with realistic assumptions, such as signal propagation loss, random node
distribution and non-instantaneous channel state information (CSI).
The first part of the thesis investigates secret communication through relay-assisted
cognitive interference channel. The primary and secondary base stations (PBS and SBS)
communicate with the primary and secondary receivers (PR and SR) respectively in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The SBS is allowed to transmit simultaneously with
the PBS over the same spectrum instead of waiting for an idle channel. To improve
security, cognitive relays transmit cooperative jamming (CJ) signals to create additional
interferences in the direction of the eavesdroppers. Two CJ schemes are proposed to
improve the secrecy rate of cognitive interference channels depending on the structure of
cooperative relays. In the scheme where the multiple-antenna relay transmits weighted
jamming signals, the combined approach of CJ and beamforming is investigated. In
the scheme with multiple relays transmitting weighted jamming signals, the combined
approach of CJ and relay selection is analyzed. Numerical results show that both these
two schemes are effective in improving physical layer security of cognitive interference
channel.
In the second part, the focus is shifted to physical layer security in a random wireless
network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes are randomly distributed. Three
scenarios are analyzed to investigate the impact of various factors on security. In
scenario one, the basic scheme is studied without a protected zone and interference. The
probability distribution function (PDF) of channel gain with both fading and path loss
has been derived and further applied to derive secrecy connectivity and ergodic secrecy
capacity. In the second scenario, we studied using a protected zone surrounding the source
node to enhance security where interference is absent. Both the cases that eavesdroppers
are aware and unaware of the protected zone boundary are investigated. Based on the
above scenarios, further deployment of the protected zones at legitimate receivers is
designed to convert detrimental interference into a beneficial factor. Numerical results
are investigated to check the reliability of the PDF for reciprocal of channel gain and to
analyze the impact of protected zones on secrecy performance.
In the third part, physical layer security in the downlink transmission of cellular network
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is studied. To model the repulsive property of the cellular network planning, we assume
that the base stations (BSs) follow the Matérn hard-core point process (HCPP), while
the eavesdroppers are deployed as an independent Poisson point process (PPP). The
distribution function of the distances from a typical point to the nodes of the HCPP is
derived. The noise-limited and interference-limited cellular networks are investigated
by applying the fractional frequency reuse (FFR) in the system. For the noise-limited
network, we derive the secrecy outage probability with two different strategies, i.e. the
best BS serve and the nearest BS serve, by analyzing the statistics of channel gains. For
the interference-limited network with the nearest BS serve, two transmission schemes are
analyzed, i.e., transmission with and without the FFR. Numerical results reveal that both
the schemes of transmitting with the best BS and the application of the FFR are beneficial
for physical layer security in the downlink cellular networks, while the improvement due
to the application of the FFR is limited by the capacity of the legitimate channel.
Lay Summary
Wireless communication is nowadays experiencing exponential growth. This has attracted
extensive research on advanced techniques. However, the security schemes to protect
security in ongoing transmission technologies remain elusive. This thesis is carried out to
enhance and evaluate physical layer security in various wireless networks.
The first part studies security in cognitive radio network. The primary and secondary
base stations (PBS and SBS) communicate with the primary and secondary receivers,
respectively. The SBS is allowed to transmit simultaneously with the PBS over the same
channel. To improve security, cognitive relay(s) transmit cooperative jamming (CJ) to
create extra noise at the eavesdroppers. Two CJ schemes are raised depending on the
existence of relays. When there is a relay equipped with multiple-antennas, the combined
approach of CJ and beamforming is investigated. When there are multiple relays, the
combined approach of CJ and relay selection is analyzed. Numerical results show that
both these two schemes are effective in improving security in cognitive radio network.
The second part investigates security in the random wireless network. Three scenarios are
investigated to analyze the impact of various factors on security. In scenario one, the basic
scheme without protected zone and interference is studied. The probability distribution
function (PDF) of channel gain with both fading and path loss has been derived. In
the second scenario, we studied using a protected zone surrounding the source node to
enhance the security. Both the cases that eavesdroppers are aware and unaware of the
protected zone boundary are investigated. Further, the structure with protected zones
surrounding legitimate receivers is designed to turn the interference into a beneficial
factor. Numerical results are investigated to check the reliability of the distribution
function of channel gain and to analyze the impact of protected zones on security.
The third part studies security of the downlink in cellular networks. To model the
repulsive property, we assume that the base stations (BSs) follow the Matérn hard-core
point process (HCPP). The noise-limited and interference-limited cellular networks are
investigated to analyze the impact of frequency reuse. For the noise-limited network, we
derive the secrecy performance in two different schemes, by analyzing the statistics of
channel gains. For the interference-limited network, the schemes of transmission with
and without the FFR are analyzed. Numerical results reveal that both the schemes of
transmitting with the best BS and FFR are beneficial for physical layer security in the
downlink cellular networks.
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Wireless communication is nowadays experiencing exponential growth in the huge
volume of data transmission, the massive mobile devices and the rapid development of
network models. This has attracted extensive research on advanced techniques of wireless
communication. However, the security schemes to protect confidentiality in ongoing
transmission technologies, such as the fifth generation (5G) network and the Internet of
Things (IoT) remain elusive.
This chapter presents a brief overview of the literature and the main motivations in Section
1.1, and specifies the layout and contributions of this thesis in Section 1.2.
1.1 Literature and Motivation
Due to the mobility of users and network components, wireless channels are susceptible
to both active and passive security attacks such as channel jamming, unauthorized access,
eavesdropping and many other formats. Modern secrecy approaches protecting wireless
communication through cryptographic techniques are founded on the assumption of the
efficiency gap between the legitimate users and the adversaries; i.e., adversaries have
limited computational capabilities to break the security scheme. The transmitter encrypts
the message with a key and sends the cipher text to a receiver over an insecure channel.
On the receiver side, the source message is extracted from the cipher text with an
associated decryption key; however, for the eavesdropper, due to practical computational
limitations, it cannot correctly interpret the message without knowing the decryption key.
The approach of using cryptography was first proposed by Shannon [3] in 1949. Two
types of encryption have been developed in cryptography in recent years: secret-key
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encryption and public-key encryption. Secret-key encryption uses a common secret key
for encryption and decryption; in public-key encryption, the transmitter and the receiver
use a public key and a private key to encrypt and decrypt, respectively.
However, the technique of using cryptographic approaches, which uses encryption keys
to transmit confidential message in the open air, faces challenges from both active and
passive attacks [4]. Firstly, there is no guarantee of security with cryptography. Many
codes that were regarded as secure twenty years ago are now easily breakable with off-
the-shelf computers. Secondly, the secret key is more vulnerable to eavesdropping as it
requires a common key must be kept secret at both ends during the secret-key agreement
and the subsequent data transmission. While the public-key scheme does not need a
secret key, its throughput rate is several orders of magnitude slower than that of the
secret-key schemes, which places a bottleneck on meeting increasing data requirements
in wireless applications. Moreover, in the large-scale, dynamic and decentralized wireless
networks, the use of an unconditional trust third party (TTP) for key management may
not be possible.
To explore the possibility of securing communication links without using cryptography in
the presence of transparent eavesdroppers1, great effort has been made to develop physical
layer security schemes. To this end, researchers have sought novel information-theoretic
techniques to secure wireless networks without the usage of secret keys. Compared
to public-key algorithms and hybrid-key algorithms, information-theoretic security is
robust to the man-in-the middle attack [5]. Besides, as designed for a different layer,
physical layer security could be implemented on existing cryptographic systems to add an
additional level of protection [5]. Moreover, physical layer security can characterize the
fundamental metrics of security in a wireless network.
This principle of perfect security was first proposed by Shannon in his paper with the
notion of perfect secrecy [3], which does not rely on any assumptions of the computational
capability of the eavesdroppers. The communication channel between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver is called the legitimate channel (the main channel), while
the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is termed the eavesdropping
1By ‘transparent eavesdropper’ we refer to an intruder as described by Wyner, with full knowledge of
the system used by the legitimate pair.
2
Introduction
channel. From the prospective of the physical layer, the received signal at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are different due to the propagation effect (the large-scale
and small-scale fading), the interference from other transmitters, and the thermal noise
at the receivers. Large-scale fading is generated by signal attenuation due to signal
propagation over large distances and diffraction around large objects in the propagation
path, i.e. path loss and shadowing. Small-scale fading is a self-interference result caused
by the multi-path propagation of radio waves.
By analyzing the information-theoretic security of discrete memoryless channels [6],
Wyner introduced the concept of wire-tap channels. It is shown that perfect secrecy
could be achieved when the legitimate receiver has a better channel than that of the
eavesdroppers. This notion was further generalized to additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels by Cheong and Hellman [7]. In [8], Csiszár and Körner considered
the broadcast wireless channels and showed that the security of a transmission can still be
guaranteed by applying sophisticated channel codes, even if the eavesdropping channel is
not a degraded version of the legitimate channel. It is proven to be secure for the wireless
systems with perfect or noisy channels [5].
Accordingly, various secrecy metrics have been put forward to evaluate physical layer
security. The rate at which information can be transmitted secretly from the source to
its intended destination is called achievable secrecy rate, while the maximum achievable
secrecy rate is called the secrecy capacity. By taking channel propagation effects into
consideration, the secrecy capacity of wireless fading channels was investigated in [9],
and expressions of the average secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage for quasi-static
fading channels were derived in [10]. Exact expression of the secrecy capacity is hard to
obtain, due to the limited knowledge of CSI and path loss in legitimate and eavesdropping
channels. Ergodic secrecy capacity, derived from statistics of CSI and distances which are
easier to obtain, can provide a single letter characterization 2 for the secrecy capacity of
an arbitrary wire-tap channel. It can also provide a helpful reference for the design of
networks such as allocating the transmission power [9] and [12].
2Although the single-letter characterization has not been generally defined, Csiszar and Korner [11]
suggested to define it through the notion of computability, i.e., a problem has a single-letter solution if it
systematically accounts underlying quantities that can serve as information measures in various contexts
and to clarify their relations.
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Based on the analysis of secrecy metrics in wireless networks, many transmission
strategies have been developed to improve physical layer security, from the perspective
of multiple antennas [13–16], cooperative relay networks [17, 18], cooperative jamming
[19–25], network coding and other signal processing techniques [26, 27], according to
different wireless network models.
Previous works on physical layer security primarily focused on point-to-point
transmissions [22, 28, 29]. Compared to the investigations of traditional transmission
models, security characteristics in large-scale networks are more dynamic and complex.
The tools of stochastic geometry were recently adopted to achieve a better understanding
of the large-scale networks where multiple transceivers are randomly deployed [30–34].
During studies of security in random wireless networks via stochastic geometric tools
[35], the notion of secrecy graphs emerged in [36]. An important distinction between
secrecy graphs and the conventional point-to-point wire-tap channel is that the topology
of networks, with respect to both the legitimate and eavesdropping nodes, plays a major
role not only in how much secrecy rate is available, but also in how to measure it.
Following this instinct, secrecy rate scaling laws were studied in [37], while the secrecy
rates of unicast links in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers were studied in [38].
Secrecy connectivity over large-scale networks were widely investigated in [35, 36] and
[39]. To enhance physical layer security in large-scale networks, various strategies were
investigated, such as guard zones [36,40,41], sectorized transmission [42], precoding [43]
and the use of artificial noise [44–46].
Physical layer security can help us to understand the secrecy limits of various wireless
networks and provide insights to design secured schemes. This thesis is devoted to
enhance and evaluate physical layer security in various wireless networks.
1.2 Thesis Layout and Contributions
In this section, we briefly describe the layout and contributions of the thesis as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a technical background for the work in the thesis. This chapter starts
with the effects of wireless channels, i.e., the small-scale fading effect and the large-
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scale fading, i.e., the path-loss effect. Afterwards, fundamentals of wireless network
models and related mathematical tools are introduced for further application in later study.
Finally, some metrics are presented to measure the performance of physical layer security.
Chapter 3 considers secret communication through relay-assisted cognitive interference
channels in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The PBS and SBS communicate with
PR and SR respectively in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The SBS is allowed to
transmit simultaneously with the PBS over the same channel instead of waiting for an idle
channel. To improve the secrecy, cognitive relays transmit CJ signals to create additional
interference in the direction of the eavesdroppers. Two CJ schemes are proposed to
improve the secrecy rate of cognitive interference channels depending on the structure
of cooperative relays:
• In the scheme where the multiple-antenna relay transmits weighted jamming
signals, the combined approach of CJ and zero-forcing is investigated. Both
scenarios, with and without the CSI of the eavesdropper are studied.
• In the scheme with multiple relays transmitting weighted jamming signals, the
combined approach of CJ and relay selection is analyzed. To reduce the complexity
of cooperation, the algorithm of relay selection is designed to minimize the source
power.
Numerical results show that both these schemes are effective in improving physical
layer security of cognitive interference channel, compared to the direct transmission with
beamforming.
Chapter 4 characterizes the secrecy performance of random wireless networks and
exploits the effect of applying interferer protected zones and secrecy protected zones.
The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We derive the distribution of channel gains from the transmitter to receivers, which
are ordered either according to the distance or the strength of the channel gain. The
PDF for the distribution of the channel gain is an important tool for calculating the
capacity at the worst-case eavesdropper3, which can be applied to derive the secrecy




outage probability and the ergodic secrecy capacity.
• The ergodic secrecy capacity of random wireless networks is analyzed by
considering both large scale path loss and small scale fading. Additionally, we
derive the distribution of path loss for the nodes outside the secrecy protected zone.
• Besides the secrecy protected zone, we also employ interferer protected zones to
restructure interference and enhance physical layer security without introducing
artificial noise. It is worth to notice that interference is different from jamming
noise, because it is the signal broadcasted by other transmitters. Moreover, the
distribution of the interference from the active cooperative transmitters that follow
a Poisson-hole process has also been exploited.
By employing protected zones, positive ergodic secrecy capacity can be achieved even
if the intensity of the legitimate nodes is smaller than that of the eavesdropping nodes
in random wireless networks. It is shown that the application of secrecy and interferer
protected zones leads to a significant improvement in the security depending on different
system parameters.
Chapter 5 studies enhancing physical layer security in the downlink transmission of
cellular networks with FFR. To model the repulsive property of the cellular networks, we
assume that the locations of the base stations (BSs) follow the HCPP. The contributions
of this research are summarized as follows:
• We derive the distance distribution of HCPP, which is then applied to investigate
the secrecy performance of transmission with the best BS.
• For the noise-limited cellular network, two transmission schemes are investigated;
the downlink transmission with and without FFR. For the scheme without FFR,
two transmission strategies are analyzed by selecting different BSs: the nearest BS
versus the best BS. In particular, the distribution of the channel gain from the best
BS is derived by exploiting the characteristic of point process.
• We further study the application of the FFR to enhance physical layer security in
interference-limited cellular networks. The PDFs of the signal-to-interference ratio
(SIR) are derived for both the scenarios with and without FFR, based on the analysis
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of the inter-cell interference.
Numerical results reveal that increasing the frequency reuse factor contributes to
enhancing the security, while the improvements will be less significant when the number
of frequency reuse factor is high. Besides, transmitting with the best BS, increasing the
intensity of BSs, and reducing the repulsive distance of the BSs can all help to improve
the secrecy performance.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions based on the work presented in the main chapters




This chapter provides a background of the thesis, starting with the properties of wireless
channels. Then, the system model of cognitive radio and its properties are introduced.
Furthermore, the fundamental concepts and models of stochastic geometry are presented
to introduce the system model of random networks and cellular networks, which will be
investigated later in the main part of the thesis.
2.1 Wireless Channel
Studying the propagation of radio signals in the wireless channels is the primary challenge
in wireless communications. It is much more complex than any other communication
system because of the physical properties of electromagnetic waves. Roughly, large-scale
fading and small-scale fading should be considered in order to characterize the mobile
wireless channel.
Most previous works on beamforming schemes focus on small-scale fading [47–49]. It
is appropriate when the strength of interference is comparable to the desired signal and
the objective is to design an efficient communication system. However, when dealing
with relevant issues such as large-scale wireless network planning, consideration of the
large-scale fading is of critical importance.
2.1.1 Fading
Fading is defined as the deviation of the attenuation affecting signals over a certain
propagation medium. Some related terms used in this thesis are given as follows [50]:
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• Large-scale fading: When the receiver moves through a distance of the order
of hundreds of wavelengths, the received signal is affected by large-scale fading
consisting of path-loss, which is a function of distance, and shadowing which is
caused by large objects such as buildings and hills.
– Path-loss: This is the mean signal attenuation in terms of the distance between
the transmitter and the receiver. The path-loss is the deterministic part of a
channel and is well studied in the urban areas in [51]. Path-loss is of critical
importance in this thesis and, thus, will be discussed in detail in the next
subsection.
• Small-scale fading: With the distance between the transmitter and the receiver
changing in the order of wavelength, the received signal changes dramatically due
to constructive and destructive interference caused by the multi-path effect between
the transmitter and the receiver. This effect is usually called small-scale fading, or
fading for simplicity.
– Rayleigh fading: Rayleigh fading is a reasonable model when there are many
objects that scatter the signal before it arrives at the receiver. Fundamentally, it
is the envelope of a circularly symmetric complex normal distributed random
variable. Statistical information of Rayleigh fading can be found in [52].
– Nakagami-m fading: Although Nakagami-m fading is out of the scope of
this thesis, it is a very useful model for large-scale wireless networks. When
the parameterm increases from one to infinity, the Nakagami-m fading model
varies from the Rayleigh fading model to the path-loss only model [53, 54].
2.1.2 Path-Loss Effect
Path-loss is the reduction in power density of an electromagnetic wave as it propagates
through space. According to the laws of physics in free space, the received power will
decay as r−2 where r is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. However,
because the reflected signals reduce the direct signal and the obstacles might also absorb
some power, the received power will decay considerably faster than r−2. According to
9
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Environment Path-Loss Exponent α
Infinite Free Space 2.0
Urban Area 2.7 to 3.5
Suburban Area 3.0 to 5.0
Office 2.6 to 3.0
Store 1.8 to 2.2
Table 2.1: Path-loss exponent values in various environments [2].
empirical evidence, the received power decays as r−2 near the transmitter and decays
exponentially at a distance far from the transmitter.
The inverse exponential relationship between received signal power and distance is
commonly known, i.e., Pr
Pt
∝ r−α, where α is called the path-loss exponent and Pr, Pt
are the received and transmit power with units in Watts (W), respectively. Although a
singular point exists in this path-loss model, its tractability has attracted a considerable
amount of work, such as [55–60]. Table 2.1 lists the empirical path-loss exponent values
in various environments.
2.2 Cognitive Radio
Due to the continual increase in demand for additional bandwidth, spectrum policy
makers and researchers are seeking solutions for spectrum scarcity. The study of spectrum
measurement, on the other hand, shows that the licensed spectrum is inefficiently used
among the time and frequency slots [61]. For the purpose of improving the spectrum
utilization efficiency and providing high bandwidth to mobile users, the next generation
of communication networks [62] program was developed to implement spectrum policy
intelligent radios, also known as cognitive radios introduced by Mitola [63], by dynamic
spectrum access techniques. Furthermore, the IEEE has organized a new working group,
known as the wireless regional area network, IEEE 802.22 [64] to develop cognitive radio
techniques and allow sharing of geographically unused television (TV) spectrum [65].
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2.2.1 The Mechanism of Cognitive Radio
As defined in Haykin’s paper [66], “cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless
communication system that is aware of its surrounding environment (i.e., outside world),
uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to learn from the environment and
adapts its internal states to statistical variations in the incoming RF stimuli by making
corresponding changes in certain operating parameters (e.g., transmit-power, carrier-
frequency, and modulation strategy) in real-time, with two primary objectives in mind:
• highly reliable communications whenever and wherever needed; and
• efficient utilization of the radio spectrum.”
To standardize cognitive radio networks, IEEE 802.22 [67] open the access of fallow TV
bands to infrastructure single-hop cognitive radio networks, with BS performing spectrum
management. This standard supports the provision of broadband fixed wireless data in
rural areas where the population is sparse.
To function properly, a cognitive-radio device should follow the closed-loop cycle.
This Observe-Decide-Act-Learn cognitive cycle is based on (1) observing the channel
status, (2) deciding the fallow spectrum available for secondary transmission, (3) acting
appropriately to achieve the required configurations of transmission, and (4) learning from
previous channel activity. This cycle allows the cognitive-radio device to self-decide
and optimally self-reconfigure its components to physically adjust the selected mode of
communication [68].
The functionalities of the cognitive radio can be summarized as [69]:
• Spectrum sensing: The function of the spectrum sensing is to allow secondary
users (SUs) to detect which portions of the spectrum are available, and monitor
the activity of the primary users (PUs).
• Spectrum management: The goal of spectrum management is to provide flexible,
fair, and efficient usage of the radio resource. According to the result of the
spectrum analysis, spectrum management can improve the spectral utilization
efficiency by providing appropriate spectrum holes to the cognitive radio users, as
11
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well as by considering their QoS requirements.
• Spectrum sharing: When there are several coexisting cognitive radio users, it is very
important to coordinate the usage of the spectrum with other SUs, by considering
both fairness and spectral efficiency. These sharing strategies should depend not
only on the spectrum availability, but also on the QoS requirements of the users.
• Spectrum mobility: When the current operating frequency becomes unavailable
during communication due to either changes over time, or movements of the
cognitive radio users, the system needs to switch to other bands in a seamless
manner.
The mechanisms of cognitive radio can be classified into two modes:
• Spectrum overlay (interweave): This mode allows SUs to utilize idle band gaps, i.e.
white space. The SUs can transmit in this mode without any power limits. Since
SUs need to detect the white spaces, there could be the chance of collision due to
the error of spectrum sensing. It is assumed that in the overlay mode the secondary
transmitter has a priori knowledge of the primary transmissions [70];
• Spectrum underlay: This mode allows the SUs to use the whole frequency band
while constraining their total interference level to the PUs. Unlike the spectrum
overlay, both PUs and SUs can occupy the same frequency bands in this mode.
Finally, it is noted that power control is also a crucial aspect in cognitive radio networks.
Specifically, since wireless users communicate via an air interface over a common shared
medium, power control is a problem that affects all users (PUs and SUs). In general,
each user’s transmission power can be considered as source of interference for all the
other users, as it can deteriorate their signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). In
addition, power control is also required since data transmission consumes valuable battery
life. Now, typically, the goal for most users is to achieve a high SINR while expending
the smallest amount of energy. Hence, there is a clear trade-off between achieving high


















Figure 2.1: Cognitive cycle.
2.2.2 Cognitive Cycle
The operations that a cognitive radio performs for adaptive operation are referred to as
the cognitive cycle. The cognitive cycle consists of the following mechanisms [71]:
1. Spectrum sensing: In this process, the SUs detect the channel activity. In the
standard of IEEE 802.22, the energy detection method has been used due to its
simplicity and low computational overhead.
2. Spectrum analysis: Based on the feedback from spectrum sensing, several
environment characteristics, such as bit error rate, capacity and delay, can be
analyzed for each spectrum hole. The analysis result will be further applied to
make spectrum decision.
3. Spectrum decision: Either performed by a single or multiple cognitive radios, this
process will select the most appropriate spectrum hole for transmission.
In the cognitive radio network, SUs not authorized the rights to use the spectrum can
utilize the temporally unused licensed bands that are authorized to the PUs [72]. As
a result, in a cognitive radio network architecture, the communication system includes












Figure 2.2: The overlay mode of cognitive radio. PT, PR, ST and SR represent the primary
transmitter, the primary receiver, the secondary transmitter and the secondary receiver,
respectively. Dashed curve represents a priori knowledge of primary message Wp at the
secondary transmitter [1].
network refers to a network constituted by a set of SUs with or without a SBS. SUs can
only access the licensed spectrum when the transmissions of PUs are absent. Therefore,
besides detecting the spectrum white space and utilizing the best spectrum band, the
secondary network need to immediately detect the communication of a PU and direct
the secondary transmission to another available band of the spectrum to avoid interfering
with the transmission of primary network [72].
2.3 Stochastic Geometry
Stochastic geometry technique deals with random spatial patterns, where point processes
are the most important and typical objects. According to [33,73,74], stochastic geometry
technique is devoted to the study of connectivity and signal power in wireless networks
where the transmitters and receivers are placed according to a certain distribution. In this
thesis, the stochastic geometry techniques will be applied to model the characteristics of




A 2-dimensional Borel set B2 is any set in a 2-dimensional topological space that can be
formed by taking the complement, countable unions and intersections of closed, open or
half-open sets. A collection of all Borel sets forms the Borel σ-algebra.
If a set consists of a countable number of singletons, it is a countable set. In a 2-
dimensional space, a set A ⊆ R2 is said to be bounded if there exists a point x ∈ R2
and value r ∈ R so that a ball centered at x with radius r, denoted as B(x, r), has
A ⊂ B(x, r). If a bounded set is also closed, it is compact.
2.3.2 Fundamentals of Point Process
The following text is a brief introduction of point process, which provides the
mathematical model to investigate the properties of random point patterns.
Definition
According to [33], a point process Φ is a countable random collection of points that reside
in some measurable space, usually a 2-dimensional Euclidean space. The associated σ-
algebra consists of the Borel sets B2, and the measure used is the Lebesgue measure.
Formalism
Generally, there are two approaches to formalize a 2-dimensional point process: the
random set formalism and the random measure formalism. In a random set formalism, a
point process is regarded as a countable set consisting of random variables. In this thesis,
the random measure formalism is considered, which characterizes a point process by the
counting measures of sets.
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Figure 2.3: Voronoi tessellation of a PPP in 2-dimensional space.
Voronoi Cell
The Voronoi cell of a point x in a point process Φ, denoted as V (x), consists of locations
in the Euclidean space of which the distances to x are not greater than the distance to any
other point in Φ, i.e.,
V (x) = {y ∈ R2 : ‖x− y‖ ≤ ‖z − y‖,∀z ∈ Φ\{x}}.
The Voronoi tessellation of Φ divides the space into separated regions, each of which
is the Voronoi cell of a point in Φ. Figure 2.3 illustrates the Voronoi tessellation of a
2-dimensional PPP with unit intensity in a 20× 20 area.
The Voronoi cell is a very important tool in wireless network planning. Inside the cell of
the i-th BS, the mean signal power from the i-th BS is larger than that of any other BSs
due to the path-loss effect. Therefore, BSs typically only serve the terminals inside their
16
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own Voronoi cells. If the BSs have different transmit power, a weighted Voronoi diagram
should be considered instead, as in [75, 76].
2.3.3 Measurability in 2-Dimensional Space
Generally, an ordered pair (A,A) is called a measurable space if A is a σ-algebra on the
subsets of A. Note that the point patterns in this thesis, i.e., (R2,B2), are measurable.
A function f : R2 7→ R is B2-measurable if and only if the pre-image of 1-dimensional
Borel set A ∈ B is an element of B2, i.e.,
f−1(A) = {x ∈ R2 : f(x) ∈ A} ∈ B2.
Consider all pairwise disjoint sets Ai ∈ A, i = 1, 2, . . . , n and n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. A measure











and satisfying ν(∅) = 0, where ∅ is the empty set.
Lebesgue Measure
The Lebesgue measure, denoted as | · |, is a commonly used measure in this thesis and
is basically a measurement of volume in Euclidean space. For example, the Lebesgue
measure of an area of a disk with radius 3 centered at point x in a 2-dimensional Euclidean
space is |B(x, 3)| = 9π.
Dirac Measure
The Dirac measure, denoted as δx(A), is a measure at point x for a set A ⊂ B2 which is






For a point process Φ, the counting measure Φ(A), where A ⊂ B2, is to count the number





It will be shown that the counting measure is the most important measure to describe a
2-dimensional point process.
Intensity Measure
The intensity measure Λ(·) for a set A, where A ⊂ B2, can be expressed by the following
equation:
Λ(A) = E[Φ(A)],
where E[·] is the expectation operation. The intensity measure can be explained as the
expected number of points falling in a set.
Campbell’s Theorem
Campbell’s theorem refers to an equation relating to the expectation of a function summed
over a point process to an integral involving the intensity measure of the point process.
For a function f : R2 7→ [0,∞) which is a measurable function and Φ is a point process,










A specific proof of the Campbell’s theorem can be found in Theorem A.2 of [77].
18
Background
2.3.4 Poisson Point Process
A PPP assumes total independence of the locations of nodes. That is to say, the location
of any node is completely uncorrelated with the locations of all other nodes. If a point
process Φ is a homogeneous PPP, i.e., a Poisson process with the same intensity λ all over
the Euclidean plane, then Φ must have the following properties:
• For any compact set A, Φ(A) has Poisson distribution with mean value λ|A|;
• If A1, A2, . . . , An are disjoint bounded sets, then Φ(A1),Φ(A2), . . . ,Φ(An) are
independent random variables.
In a 2-dimensional space, a homogenous PPP can be characterized by counting measure













, k ∈ N,
and its pattern can be seen from Figure 2.4. Note that P(·) means the probability that an
event happens. PPP is the most fundamental point process and will be studied in Chapter
5.
2.3.5 Hard-Core Point Process
A HCPP is a random point process which is more repulsive than a PPP. All the points in
the HCPP are distributed at a distance larger than a minimum value to each other. A HCPP
is generally obtained by removing points which violate the restriction of a more general
point process, such as PPP. Two of the most well-studied models are the Matérn HCPP
of types I and II as investigated in [33]. Due to the tractability of the interference [78],
we will analyze type II to model wireless networks later in this thesis. Consider a parent
point process Φp = {(xi,mi); i = 1, 2, 3, · · · } which is a marked PPP, where xi denotes
the ith point of the process and mi stands for its mark which is uniformly distributed in
the range [0, 1]. A HCPP can be obtained by removing all the points in Φp that have a
neighbor within distance % and have smaller marks. The deployment of the Matérn HCPP
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Figure 2.4: Poisson point process.
is shown in Figure 2.5.
Given a minimum distance % and the intensity of the parent Poisson point process λp, the








2.3.6 Poisson Hole Process
Let Φ1 and Φ2 be independent PPPs of intensities λ1 < λ2. For each x ∈ Φ1, remove all
the points of {y|y ∈ Φ2 ∩ D(x, r)}, where D(x, r) is a ball centered at x with radius r.
Denote the Poisson hole process as Φphp, then Φphp = Φ2 \
⋃
{D(x, r), x ∈ Φ1}. All the
removed points of Φ2 form the hole-0 process and the remaining points of Φ2 form the
hole-1 process which is defined as the Poisson hole process [33].
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Figure 2.5: Hard-core point process.
The probability of a point being retained is the probability that it has no point of Φ1 within
distance r. It is given by
λphp = λ2 exp(−λ1πr2). (2.2)
The application of the Poisson hole process can be applied to many wireless networks,
such as ad-hoc networks and cognitive radio networks. An illustration of the Poisson hole
process can be found in Figure 2.6.
2.3.7 Wireless Networks and Point Processes
Point processes in this thesis are collections of random points that reside in 2-dimensional
spaces. Each point represents the location of one node (transmitter or receiver) in wireless

















Figure 2.6: Poisson hole process.
As shown in the figure, the deployment of BSs in large cities such as London has a random
allocation, rather than a deterministic pattern or lattice. Accordingly, it is rational to model
the network of wireless users with stochastic geometry tools.
2.4 Physical Layer Security
2.4.1 Theory of Physical Layer Security
The basic idea of physical layer security is to use the inherent randomness of the physical
medium and exploit the difference between the channel to a legitimate receiver and the
channel to an eavesdropper to securely transmit confidential messages [5]. The theoretical
basis for physical layer security is derived from the wire-tap channel model, and then



















Figure 2.8: Wyner’s wire-tap channel.
noise is an intrinsic element of almost all physical communication channels. In an effort
to understand the role of noise in the context of secure communications, the wire-tap
channel model was introduced by Wyner as illustrated in Figure 2.8 [6]. This model can
be described as follows:
• the legitimate transmitter maps a message M into a codeword X n consisting of
n symbols, which is then transmitted through a wire-tap channel with a transition
probability of PY Z|X(·|·);
• the eavesdropper observes a noisy version, denoted by Zn, of the signal Yn
available at the legitimate receiver.
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2.4.2 Performance Metric of Physical Layer Security
This subsection provides a brief overview of secrecy metrics to measure the performance
of physical layer security in wireless networks, which are investigated in this thesis.
Secrecy Capacity
Like Shannon’s capacity, the secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable
secrecy rate over all possible encoding-decoding schemes. The notion of the secrecy
capacity was initiated in Wyner’s seminal work [6], where a positive secrecy rate was first
characterized for a degraded wire-tap channel, i.e., the eavesdropper’s observation being
a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s information.
Let a message M of length k be encoded into a codeword X n of length n, and then
transmitted. A legitimate receiver obtains Yn over the main channel denoted Qm, and an
eavesdropper obtains Zn, a degraded version of Yn, through an additional channel called
the wire-tap channel Qw. Csiszár and Körner [8] generalized these results by removing
the constraint of degraded channel, while still showed that Cs > 0, only if Qm is less
noisy than Qw. These generalized the concept of wire-tap channel model and provided












= Cl − Ce
(2.3)
where Cl is the capacity of the main channel, and Ce is the capacity of the eavesdropping
channel. Intuitively, the greater advantage in channel equality that a legitimate receiver
can leverage over an eavesdropper, the higher the rate at which data can be encoded but
remain secret.
When specifying the case of a single-input single-output (SISO) Gaussian wire-tap
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channel, equation (2.3) can be further simplified as [7]
Cs =
[
Cl(P )− Ce(P )
]+
(2.4)
where [A]+ = max{0, A}; P is the transmission power; Cl(P ) and Ce(P ) denote the
(Shannon) channel capacities of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel,
respectively.
Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity/rate analysis requires the CSI of the eavesdropping channel, while
in practice, the location of the eavesdroppers or even the presence of eavesdroppers
is unknown. In the ergodic secrecy setting, it is assumed that the transmitter knows
the channel information of the legitimate receiver, but is unaware of the eavesdropping
channel. For analysis, the transmitter relies on the channel statistics information of the
eavesdroppers. Reference [79] assumes that the legitimate and eavesdropping channels
experience independent block fading, where the channel gains remain constant during
each coherence interval and change independently from one coherence interval to the next.
Under these assumptions, assuming unit noise power at both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, when the transmitter knows the statistics of CSI for both the legitimate






[log (1 + Pgl(x))− log (1 + Pge(y))] fgl(x)fge(y)dxdy, (2.5)
where gl(·) and ge(·) denote the channel gain of the legitimate and the eavesdropping
channels, respectively.
Secrecy Outage Probability
The concept of secrecy outage probability was introduced in [10]. The fading assumption
used in [10] is similar to [79], where the legitimate and eavesdropping channels
experience independent block fading, and the channel gains remain quasi-static during
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each coherence interval and change independently from one coherence interval to the
next. If the transmitter knows the channel information of both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, it can set the wire-tap code to transmit at a rate Rs = [Cl − Ce]+.
In such case, the legitimate receiver can receive the secret information at the rate Rs
whereas Eve receives no information of it and hence the security is achieved. However,
if the transmitter is unaware of the eavesdropping channel, then she can only rely on the
CSI of the legitimate channel to send the secret message. If the transmitter transmits at an
arbitrary rate R, then physical layer security is achieved only when R ≤ Rs. For the case
when R > Rs, the security of the link is compromised. Secrecy outage probability is an
important system design guideline that can help the transmitter choose the wire-tap code
rate R. The secrecy outage probability is defined as follows:
Pso(R) = P[Rs < R]. (2.6)
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Security of Cognitive Radio Networks
with Cooperative Jamming
3.1 Introduction
Cognitive radio networks have recently gained attention as a promising concept regarding
the use of licensed frequencies more efficiently. A secondary (unlicensed) transmission
system can access the resources of the primary system in an opportunistic manner when
these are not used or when a threshold performance of the primary system can be
guaranteed. Due to the open and dynamic nature of its architecture, the security in
cognitive radio networks has attracted increased attentions in recent years [13–15, 80].
Various approaches such as secret key generation, multi-antenna transmission, CJ and
cognitive relay are explored to defend against different eavesdropping attacks on the
cognitive radio networks [81].
The relationship between the multi-antenna cognitive radio transmission problem and the
secrecy transmission problem was developed in [13]. By using this relationship, the
non-convex secrecy rate computation problem has also been transformed into a quasi-
convex optimization problem for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) channel. The
secrecy capacity of the MISO cognitive radio channel was studied in [14] where two
numerical approaches were proposed to derive the optimal transmit covariance matrix.
The first approach transferred the original quasi-convex problem into a single convex
semidefinite program while the second one transferred the original quasi-convex problem
into a sequence of optimization problems which helps to prove that beamforming is
the optimal strategy for the secure MISO cognitive radio channel. With a confidential
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message, a single-letter expression for the capacity-equivocation region was developed
in [82] in the case of a discrete memoryless cognitive interference channel. The problem
of optimal robust transmitter design was addressed in [15] for a MISO cognitive radio
network in order to maximize the achievable secrecy rate region for the secondary user,
keeping the interference at the primary receiver under a certain threshold. The secrecy
capacity of a cognitive radio network with multiple primary users, secondary users and
eavesdroppers was studied in [83] based on stochastic distributions.
Moreover, CJ also becomes a promising technique to enhance physical layer security in
wireless networks, i.e., the artificial noise is generated by the cooperative transmitter(s)
to confuse the eavesdroppers [20–24]. In [21], CJ was adopted to increase the achievable
sum rate of a Gaussian multiple-access wire-tap channel and a Gaussian two-way wire-tap
channel. The secrecy rate of a relay-assisted CJ scheme consisting a transmitter, a receiver
and an eavesdropper was studied in [22] and showed that a CJ scheme can significantly
increase the secrecy rate of the wire-tap channel. To increase the physical layer security
of fading channels via distributed relays, the combination of CJ with convex optimization
and one-dimensional search was investigated in [23]. Partial and full CJ strategies with
linear precoding were later developed in [24] to enhance the secrecy rate of two-hop
relay channels, where single or multiple data streams are transmitted with decoding-and-
forwarding (DF) relays. The robust transmission schemes with multiple antennas were
analyzed in [16,26,84,85] with CJ to enhance the security. In [16], CJ was also designed
to increase the worst-case secrecy rate and to degrade the SINR at eavesdropper for both
individual and global power constraint.
Given the availability of multiple relays, cooperative communication is also a promising
approach to achieve significant secrecy improvement [22–24] and [86–91]. In [22],
multiple cooperating relays were investigated to address the secure communications
of a source-destination pair with three cooperative schemes, i.e. decode-and-forward
(DF), amplify-and-forward (AF), and CJ. Secure communication with MIMO relay
networks was analyzed in [24] with linear precoding and the generalized singular value
decomposition (GSVD) schemes, to increase the secrecy rate. To explore the benefits of
wireless networks with multiple relays, the relay selection approaches were proposed to
carry out CJ, AF or DF in [86] and [87]. The secrecy outage probabilities of different
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transmission relay selection policies were analyzed to characterize the impact of the
proposed policy and the interference power constraint. The joint relay and jammer
selection was also investigated in [90] and [91]. In [90], the selection vector was designed
to minimize the secrecy outage probability, while the study in [91] introduced several new
concepts such as the reliable-and-secure connection probability and the effective secrecy
throughput to characterize the security in the face of delayed CSI feedback.
In this chapter, we study the CJ scheme to enhance the physical layer security of
cognitive radio networks where both primary and secondary users are allowed to transmit
information simultaneously under the assumption that the CSI of eavesdropper may or
may not present. According to two different settings of the cognitive radio networks, this
chapter is separated into two sections. The first section mainly addresses the following
aspects: i) The loss of secrecy rate of secondary user due to interference is quantified
while controlling interference from secondary transmitter to primary receiver under a
certain constraint. ii) A CJ scheme is developed for a cognitive radio network that
will increase the secrecy rate of both primary and secondary transmissions without
creating any interference to their receivers. iii) Two precoding strategies are proposed
to obtain optimum secrecy rate with full CSI and partial CSI. The content of the second
section includes: i) We use multiple relays to create jamming noise in the direction of
eavesdropper and develop an algorithm to find the minimum number of effective relays
to meet the target secrecy rate at SR. ii) We minimize the secondary transmit power with
a secrecy rate constraint keeping interference at the PR under a certain threshold.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a general
system model and a brief introduction of the cognitive radio network. Section 3.3
proposes the combined approach of cooperative jamming and beamforming. Section
3.4 further investigates the scenario with multiple relays by applying relay selection. A
summary is given in Section 3.5.
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3.2 System Model
We first consider a cognitive radio network with a PU, a SU, a PR, a SR, an eavesdropper
E and a cognitive relay with multiple antennas, as depicted in Figure 3.1. PU, PR, CR
and SR are equipped with NA, Na, Nr and Nb antennas, respectively, while SU and E are
equipped with a single antenna. The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive so that the
source information is interpreted by the eavesdropper without modifying it. In the partial
CSI scenario, the channel information of eavesdropper is unavailable, while other channel
information can be obtained for both the primary and secondary users. The direct channel
coefficient between SU and SR is hss ∈ CNb×1, while the cross-over channel coefficient
between PU and SR is Hsp ∈ CNb×NA and that between SU and PR is hps ∈ CNa×1. The
channel coefficient between PU and E is hep ∈ C1×NA and that between SU and E is hes.
The transmission channel between PU and PR is Hpp ∈ CNa×NA . All the channels are
assumed to be Rayleigh fading. PU and SU transmit independent signals xp and xs to
the PR and SR, respectively. Correspondingly, their transmission powers are allocated as
E(|xp|2) = Pp, E(|xs|2) = Ps and the power for cooperative jamming is E(|z|2) = Pr
where z is the jamming signal. The total power is Po, so that Po = Pp + Ps + Pr. At
first, we discuss a benchmark scheme without cooperation, i.e., direct transmission to
quantify the loss of secrecy rate at SR denoted by Rs due to effect of interferences. Then,
we discuss the CJ schemes according to different configurations of relays and quantify
the improvement in the secrecy rate of SR due to the combined approach of CJ with
beamforming and relay selection, respectively.
3.3 Combined Approach of Cooperative Jamming and
Beamforming
In this section, at first, we quantify the loss in Rs due to the effect of interference in
the case of direct transmission. Then, we quantify the improvement in Rs due to the CJ
scheme by keeping the interference at the PR under a certain threshold.
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Figure 3.1: Securing cognitive radio with CJ
3.3.1 Direct Transmission
When both the PU and SU transmit simultaneously, PR and SR experience interference
due to the signals of SU and PU, respectively, but E experiences interference from both
the PU’s and SU’s signals. The powers assigned to PU and SU are denoted by Pp and Ps,
respectively. Therefore, received signals at the PR, SR and E are given by
yp = Hppxp + hpsxs + np,
ys = hssxs + Hspxp + ns,
ye = hepxp + hesxs + ne,
(3.1)
where np ∼ CN (0, σ2sINa), ns ∼ CN (0, σ2sINb) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) denote the
Gaussian noises imposed on SR and E, respectively.
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where µ ∈ CNA×1 is a precoding vector of the primary transmission. Similarly, the rate























a (Pp ‖ hep‖2 + σ2e)
b (Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s)
)]+
(3.4)
where a = Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + Ps ‖ hss‖2 + σ2s and b = Pp‖hep‖2 + Ps|hes|2 + σ2e . If there is





σ2e (Ps ‖ hss‖2 + σ2s)
σ2s (Ps|hes|2 + σ2e)
)]+
. (3.5)
Therefore, the loss of secrecy rate at SR due to the effect of interference created by the






bσ2e (Ps ‖ hss‖2 + σ2s) (Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s)




Consequently, the loss of secrecy rate will be affected by the channel fading, transmission
powers at the transmitters and the noises at the receivers. Numerical result for the loss
caused by interference will be further illustrated in Figure 3.6.
3.3.2 Cooperative Jamming
The cognitive relay transmits a weighted jamming signal z which is independent of the
signals transmitted by the PU and SU with the purpose of confusing the eavesdropper.
Besides, the cooperative artificial noise would be orthogonal to both the primary
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and secondary information signal, i.e, generating no interference to both primary and
secondary transmission. We proposed a beamforming scheme to cancel the jamming
interference. The precoding vector for PU, SU and cooperative relay are denoted by vp,
vs and w respectively, with v†pvp = 1, v†svs = 1, and w†w = 1. where, † denotes Hermitian
transposition. Therefore, received signals at the PR, SR and E are given by
yp = Hppvpxp + hpsvsxs + Hprwz + np, (3.7)
ys = hssvsxs + Hspvpxp + Hsrwz + ns, (3.8)
ye = hepvpxp + hesvsxs + herwz + ne, (3.9)
where Hpr ∈ CNa×Nr , Hsr ∈ CNb×Nr and her ∈ C1×Nr represent channel coefficients
from cognitive relay to PR, SR and E, respectively. Receivers use beamforming vectors
to cancel the jamming interferences. We assume that primary and secondary channel
information are unavailable for eavesdropper. Studies about the secrecy capacity in
cognitive scenarios where an eavesdropper knows about the CSI would be considered
in future research. The optimal beamforming scheme of an eavesdropper in the case
where the eavesdropper knows about the CSI of primary and secondary transmission will
be given in following discussion. The signals after beamforming can be expressed as
ŷp = u
†
p(Hppvpxp + hpsvsxs + Hprwz + np), (3.10)
ŷs = u
†
s(hssvsxs + Hspvpxp + Hsrwz + ns), (3.11)
ŷe = hepvpxp + hesvsxs + herwz + ne. (3.12)
The resulting SINRs available for primary receiver, secondary receiver and eavesdropper
are given as
SINRp =
















Pp | hepvp |2
Ps | hesvs |2 +Pr | herw |2 +σ2e
, (3.15)
SINRes =
Ps | hesvs |2
Pp | hepvp |2 +Pr | herw |2 +σ2e
, (3.16)
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where Qp = vpv†p, Qs = vsv†s, Qw = ww†. Here, up = Hppvp and us = hssvs
are beamforming vectors of primary and secondary receivers to maximize the signal
power and cancel interference from cooperative jamming. For the scenario where the
eavesdropper is aware of primary and secondary transmission CSI, maximizing the SINR
at eavesdropper is a generalized eigenvector problem [22]. The optimum beamforming
vector for the eavesdropper is






when its target is primary information signal or






when its target is secondary information signal.
With total power constraint, we use part of the source power to transmit information
signals and use the remaining power for cooperative jamming. Power allocations are
optimized to maximize the secrecy rate at SR.
In this research, we assume that primary power limit Pp is fixed and given. To maximize
the secrecy rate, the right singular vector vp of Hpp with the largest singular value is
chosen as the precoding vector for the primary transmission. For the secondary user,
we choose vs for precoding. In our design, we aim at transmitting primary resource and
secondary resource according to the waterfilling principle and arranging extra power for
cooperative jamming that will not generate any interference to the primary or secondary
receiver, that is, using ZF to cancel cooperative jamming at PR and SR. Even though the
optimal CJ has been investigated in point to point transmission, the models are solved
by the combination of a suboptimal problem and a one-dimensional search [23], or the
Newton method [92]. As optimal relay weights are intractable and difficult to obtain,
we consider the suboptimal constraint of ZF [22] [24], i.e., for CJ, the jamming signal
is completely nulled out at the destination. Then, the precoding vectors should meet the
following requirements
Hppvp ⊥ Hprw, (3.17)
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hssvs ⊥ Hsrw. (3.18)
As vp is the singular vector corresponding to the largest singular value of Hpp, Hprw can
be expressed by a linear combination of NA−1 right singular vectors of Hpp with smaller
singular values. We define
Hprw = Tλ, (3.19)
where T = [v2 v3 . . . vNA ], in which vi is the ith orthogonal vector corresponding to
the ith eigenvector of Hpp, ‖vi‖2 = 1 and v†ivj = 0 (i 6= j), i, j ∈ {2, 3, · · · , NA}.
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λNA−1)
† ∈ C(NA−1)×1 is the linear combining coefficient vector. Notice
that T is obtained from Hpp by first using eigen decomposition to obtain the space of
eigenvectors and then using QR decomposition to acquire orthogonal basis to represent
the orthogonal subspace of the other NA − 1 eigenvectors of Hpp using Algorithm 3.3.1.
Algorithm 3.3.1: CJ precoding vector design
1 : Input: Hpp,Hpr,λ.
2 : begin
3 : Calculate eigen decomposition of Hpp, [V,D] = eig(Hpp), producing matrices of
eigenvalues D and eigenvectors V of Hpp.
4 : Fetch precoding vector vp, the first column of V.
5 : Calculate QR decomposition of V, [Q,R] = qr(V), producing orthogonal unitary
matric Q and upper triangular matrix R .




, i 6= 1, Qi,j denotes an element of Q .
7 : w = H−1pr Tλ.
8 : end
9 : Output: vp,w,T.
For the case that Na 6= Nr, Hpr is not a square matrix. We use a zero-forcing equalizer(
H†prHpr
)−1 H†pr [93] instead of H−1pr in the algorithm to search for w to achieve orthogonal
conditions in (3.17) and (3.18). For requirement (3.18), w should meet the following
constraint:
(Hsrw)†hssvs = 0, then (3.20)
λ†T†(Hpr−1)†H†srhssvs = 0. (3.21)
As a result, w obtained from equation (3.21) will automatically achieve the criterion of
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(3.17) and (3.18), i.e., generating no jamming interference to the primary and secondary
receiver.
3.3.3 Known CSI of Eavesdropper
When the CSI of eavesdropper is known, we try to align cooperative jamming power
along the largest eigenvalue direction of channel her using a Minimum Mean Square Error
(MMSE) criterion while keeping the jamming signal orthogonal to primary and secondary




s.t. w = Hpr−1Tλ, w†w ≤ 1,
λ†T†(Hpr−1)†Hsr†hssvs = 0. (3.22)
As the objective function and constraints are convex, the optimum value of w and λ in
the minimization problem (3.22) is easy to solve using convex optimization, denoted by
w∗ and λ∗. Define Q1w = w∗w∗
†. Substitute w∗ and Q1w into (3.14) and (3.16), the secrecy
rate of secondary user is given by



















Ps | hesvs |2




















b1 = a1a0 − |herw∗|2, b2 = −a1|herw∗|2 and c1 = ‖hes‖2 − |herw∗|2.
For the cognitive network, we assume an interference constraint Γm on the secondary
transmission to keep the PR in a certain interference temperature. As transmission power
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for PR is given, its maximum secrecy rate would be fixed in a certain interference
temperature Γm. Here, we mainly consider enhancing the security of the secondary
transmission by optimizing the transmission power allocation between information and








s + b1Ps + a0
c1Ps + a0
)]+
s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P0 − Pp, (3.24)
Psup†HpsQsH†psup ≤ Γm.
3.3.4 Unknown CSI of Eavesdropper
When the CSI of eavesdropper is unknown, the optimum choice is to first meet a fixed
target rate for the secondary transmission, and then allocate the remaining power for
jamming signal along the whole spatial dimensions that will not generate any interference
to PR and SR. These targets can be achieved by searching for the precoding vector w for
relay fulfilling the orthogonal conditions of (3.20) and (3.22). Rewrite (3.22) as
λ†η = 0, (3.25)
where η = T
†(Hpr−1)†H†srhssvs
‖T†(Hpr−1)†H†srhssvs‖
, η ∈ C(NA−1)×1. Define
Ω = nullspace(η),
where Ω = { [e1, e2, · · · , eNA−2]
∣∣ ‖ei‖2 = 1, i = {1, 2, · · ·NA − 2}} is a (NA − 1) ×
(NA − 2) matrix, denoting the null space of η. Uniformly distributing jamming power






Security of Cognitive Radio Networks with Cooperative Jamming
Notice that the coefficient 1
NA−2















Substitute expressions (3.14), (3.16) and (3.27) into expression



















Ps | hesvs |2
Pp | hepvp |2 +Pr | herw∗ |2 +σ2e
)]+
, (3.28)
we obtain the secrecy rate of the secondary transmission. Notice that, the channel
information of the eavesdropper is unknown, and here a random channel coefficient value
is generated for investigating the possible secrecy rate. Theoretically, the secrecy rate of
primary transmission would also be increased as the jamming will only degrade the QoS
of the eavesdropper. On the one hand, due to the unknown channel information of the
eavesdropper, secrecy rate maximization for secondary transmission is also unavailable,
while on the other hand, this approach still enhances the secrecy rate of the cognitive
system.
3.3.5 Numerical Results
We used Monte Carol method to statistically test the system performance and all results
are tested based on 10000 independent trials. In the simulation, all the channel coefficients
are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian. Two scenarios are considered. In the first
scenario where the SINR at primary receiver, secondary receiver and eavesdropper and the
secrecy rate at secondary receiver are considered, the CSI of the eavesdropper is known.
In the second one where this parameter is unknown, i.e., partial CSI, the metric is secrecy
rate at secondary receiver with a random CSI of the eavesdropper. The transmit power
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SINR at primary receiver
SINR for xp at eavesdropper
SINR at secondary receiver
SINR for xs at eavesdropper
Figure 3.2: The SINR at PR, SR and E, as a function of cooperative jamming power Pr
with Pp = 10dBm and Ps = 10dBm.
at the PU is Pp = 10dBm. The noises experienced at PR, SR and the eavesdropper are




e = 1dBm. The number of antennas are given as
NA = 5, Na = 5, Nr = 5, Ne = 1, NB = 1, and Nb = 4.
Figure 3.2 shows the impact of cooperative jamming on the SINR at the PR, the SR
and the eavesdropper in the scenario with Ps = 10dBm. In this scenario, the primary
and secondary transmission power are fixed while the SINR is investigated as a function
of the power of cooperative jamming with the CSI of eavesdropper available. Results
in Figure 3.2 show that when increasing the power of cooperative jamming, both the
SINRs of the primary and secondary receiver are not affected. However, both the SINRs
of the primary and secondary signal at the eavesdropper are degraded which lead to
increasing the secrecy capacity at the primary and secondary receiver. Note that, we
analyze the SINR rather than the secrecy capacity to show an underlying cause of security
performance improvement. As shown in Figure 3.2, there exist gaps between the SINRs
at the legitimate receiver and that at the eavesdropper. The differences are due to the
application of precoding at the transmitters which is aimed at enhancing the legitimate
transmission.
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Secrecy Rate of Direct Transmission
Secrecy Rate of CJ with ZF to SR
Secrecy Rate of CJ with ZF to PR and SR
ΓInterference Temperature Limit e       ,
Figure 3.3: The secrecy rate, Rs, as a function of interference constraint Γm with
Po = 40dBm and Pp = 10dBm.
Figure 3.3 shows the secrecy rate Rs as a function of interference temperature limit Γm
with Po = 40dBm. The power allocation between Pr and Ps is optimized to achieve
maximum secrecy rate at SR. The results are based on the assumption that the CSI of the
eavesdropper is known. According to Figure 3.3, the secrecy rate of the scheme using
CJ with ZF only to SR is larger than direct transmission, while smaller than the scheme
using a well-designed CJ scheme with ZF to both primary and secondary receivers. All
the secrecy rates of the three schemes are zero when the interference constraint at the
primary receiver is zero. Note that these points in the figure are not shown as we use the
function of semilogy for description.
Figure 3.4 investigated the impact of CJ on the secrecy rate at the SR in the scenario
with partial CSI. The CSI of the eavesdropper is generated randomly without being used
for optimizing the cooperative communication. The secrecy rate Rs is considered as a
function of the jamming power Pr and the transmission power at the SR is assumed to
be fix, i.e., Ps = 10dBm. As shown in Figure 3.4, even though the CSI of eavesdropper
is unknown, CJ still can be adopted and optimized to increase the secrecy rate at the
secondary receiver. Even though a certain secrecy rate cannot be assured, the power of CJ
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Secrecy Rate of Patial CSI at SR with CJ
Secrecy Rate of Patial CSI at SR without CJ
Figure 3.4: The secrecy rate, Rs, as a function of Pr with Pp = 10dBm and Ps = 10dBm.
can be optimized to enhance the security of the legitimate transmission. The upper bound
for the improvement is the capacity of SR.
3.4 Combined Approach of Cooperative Jamming and
Relay Selection
In the case of low-density network (i.e., networks with a small number of relays), the
secrecy rate changes rapidly with an increase in the number of relays [83]. Motivated
with this issue, we proposed a solution to choose the smallest set of active relays that meet
the predetermined performance goal instead of using all the available relays, as shown in
Figure 3.5. The total number of relays is denoted as Nr and each of them is assumed to
be equipped with single antenna.
The relays are connected with the PU and SU using backhauls. As the CSIs need to
be shared among the base stations and relays for decision, timing and synchronization
are crucial for the performance of the network. Consequently, the ideal technologies for
backhaul in our case include leased T1/E1 copper, optical fiber and wireless backhaul
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Figure 3.5: Securing cognitive radio with CJ
with microwave [94, 95]. When deployment of fiber is inconvenient or even unavailable,
such as mobile backhaul with the relay on vehicles and trains, wireless backhaul with
microwave can be applied to solve the challenge of infrastructure installation. However,
the technology of microwave has the line of sight (LOS) requirement [94] and may leak
the CSI to eavesdropper. Considering about the security of CSI, we assume that wired
connections are available and optical fiber or copper is implemented for backhaul in
this work. There is a system controller which enable the scheduling of the relays in
a centralized manner [96]. The controller can use a scheduling vector relying on the
collected system state information. According to the transmission target and networking
dynamics, the system controller selects a set of relays which reflects an optimization
objective.
Note that, in Figure 3.1, it is assumed that only one relay exists with multiple antenna,
while in Figure 3.5, we analyzed relay selection for the scenario that there are multiple
relays. To be more conservative about the capability of the eavesdropper, it is assumed to
be equipped with multiple antennas in Figure 3.5 and its antenna number is Ne. In this
section, the combined approach of CJ and relay selection will be applied to investigate
the problem of secrecy capacity maximization and power minimization, respectively.
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3.4.1 Cooperative Jamming
When both PU and SU transmit simultaneously without relays, we have Hsr = Her = 0.





a (Pp ‖ Hepµ‖2 + σ2e)
b (Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s)
)]+
, (3.29)
where a = Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 +Ps ‖ hss‖2 +σ2s , b = Pp‖Hepµ‖2 +Ps‖hes‖2 +σ2e and µ is the
precoding vector of the primary transmission. If there is no interference, the maximum





σ2e (Ps ‖ hss‖2 + σ2s)
σ2s (Ps‖hes‖2 + σ2e)
)]+
. (3.30)







bσ2e (Ps ‖ hss‖2 + σ2s) (Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s)




With the assumption that the interference at the PR is maintained under a certain threshold
Γm, secrecy rate at the SR is given by,













Pp ‖ Hepµ‖2+ ‖ Herw‖2 + σ2e
)]+
s.t. Ps ‖ hps‖2 + ‖Hprw‖2 ≤ Γm,
(3.32)
where Ps‖hps‖2 and ‖Hprw‖2 denote interferences at the PR due to the signals of SU
and relays, respectively. Since the secrecy rate of (3.32) can be viewed as a product of
correlated generalized eigenvectors, the problem of secrecy rate maximization at the SR
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s.t. Hsrw = 0ns×1,
‖ w‖2 ≤ Po − (Pp + Ps) and
Ps ‖ hps‖2 + ‖Hprw‖2 ≤ Γm.
(3.33)
In order to satisfy the constraint of Hsrw = 0ns×1, w must lie in the null space of Hsr.
The projection of null space matrix of Hsr can be expressed as




so that, Λw = w and w†Λ = w†. The maximization of ‖Herw‖2 is equivalent to the
maximization of ‖w†ΛH†er‖2. Since Λ is a Hermitian matrix, w†, ΛH†er are both in the
null space of Hsr and the norm of w and ΛH†er are fixed. Therefore, the maximization





We see that w is proportional to
√
Po − (Pp + Ps). Let us define
w =
√
Po − (Pp + Ps)v, (3.35)




. Substituting (3.35) into (3.32), we have
Rsc (w, Ps) = log2
(









Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s
, η = ‖hes‖2 − ‖Herv‖2,
b3 =
‖ hss‖2 (Pp‖Hepµ‖2 + Po|Herv|2 + σ2e)
Pp ‖ Hspµ‖2 + σ2s
− ‖Herv‖2
and c2 = Pp‖Hepµ‖2 + P0‖Herv‖2 + σ2e .
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Table 3.1: All possible combinations for the selection of relays. 
 
   Possible Combinations of Relays 
                  
   LSC  MSC 














) Relay 1: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Relay 2: 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Relay 3: 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 






≥ t where t ≥ 0. Define µ(Ps) = c2 + b3Ps + a2P 2s ,
ν(Ps) = ηPs + c2 and φt(Ps) = µ(Ps) − tν(Ps). Since µ
′′
(Ps)
= α ≤ 0, µ(Ps) is concave.
Moreover, ν(Ps) is affine. So, φt(Ps) is a decreasing function of t and the maximization














The optimal t which maximizes Rsc (w, Ps) can be obtained from the solution of (3.37).
Let t∗ denotes the optimal t. Then, the optimized secrecy rate at the SR is given by
R∗sc (w, Ps) = log2(t
∗). (3.38)






t∗ (Pp‖Hspµ‖2 + σ2s) (Pp‖Hepµ‖2 + Ps‖hes‖2 + σ2e)
(Pp‖Hepµ‖2 + σ2e) (Pp‖Hspµ‖2 + Ps‖hss‖2 + σ2e)
)]+
. (3.39)
3.4.2 Selection of Effective Relays
In the case of low-density networks (i.e., networks with a small number of relays), the
secrecy rate changes rapidly with an increase in the number of relays [83]. Motivated with
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this issue, in this subsection, we provide a solution to choose the smallest set of active
relays that meet the predetermined performance goal instead of using all the available
relays. Note that, cooperative jamming provided by the selected relays still maintain
interference temperature limit on the PR under Γm.
In order to select the number of effective relays, let us define the target secrecy rate as
Rstarget = θRscmax (w, Ps) , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (3.40)
where Rscmax (w, Ps) is the maximum value of Rsc (w, Ps). Let q = (q1, q2, ..., qK)T
denotes the relay selection vector where qi, i = 1, 2, ..., K is defined as
qi =
1, if ith relay is active,0, otherwise. (3.41)
Therefore, the channel vector from relays to E can be expressed as
Her = (q1her1 , q2her2 , ..., qKherK )
T , (3.42)
where heri denotes the channel coefficient of ith relay to E. To some extent, the selection
of effective relays is like searching for the effective relay channels. Substituting (3.42)
into (3.36), the secrecy rate is estimated as
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wi and wj denote the weight of ith and jth relay, and heri and herj denote the channel
coefficients from ith and jth relay to E, respectively. Therefore, the optimization problem
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s.t. R̃sc (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget , (3.43)
where qi ∈ {0, 1} indicates that qi is either 0 or 1. The ith relay is selected when qi is
1. R̃sc(w, Ps) can be maximized using the similar procedure as discussed above. The
number of effective relays is estimated based on R̃scmax (w, Ps), where R̃scmax (w, Ps)
denotes the maximum of R̃sc (w, Ps). At first, we generate a K × 2K matrix in which
each column indicates a possible combination of relay selections. For example, in the
case of four relays, i.e., for K = 4, all possible combinations of relay selections are
shown in Table I. In the 5th combination, 2nd and 4th relays are activated and 1st and
3rd relays are kept inactive. Let Nr denotes the number of effective relays. Initially,
we assign Nr = 1 and calculate R̃scmax (w, Ps) for all possible combinations of relays
satisfying Nr =
∑K
i=1 qi. In order to find the final value of Nr, at first, R̃scmax (w, Ps) of
each combination is compared with Rstarget . If R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget , then Nr = 1,
and it is 4th relay as shown in Table I. If R̃scmax (w, Ps) < Rstarget , then we increase
Nr by 1 and calculate R̃scmax (w, Ps) for all possible combinations of relays satisfying
Nr =
∑K
i=1 qi. Again, the R̃scmax (w, Ps) of each combination is compared with
Rstarget . In this way, R̃scmax (w, Ps) of each combination starting from least significant
combination (LSC) to most significant combination (MSC) is compared withRstarget until
R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget . If R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget for a certain combination, Nr is
determined from that combination. For example, if R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget is found at
the 5th combination, then Nr = 2, and they are the 2nd and 4th relays in Table I. The
following algorithm summarizes the selection process of effective relays.
Note that, the complexity of this algorithm increases exponentially with the selected
number of relays and the optimization of the secrecy capacity is iterated. This approach
has a complexity of ∼ O(2K) [97]. To reduce the complexity for the scenarios with large
numbers of relays, the individual relay selection algorithm and the beamforming weights
norm algorithm [97] can be applied.
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Algorithm 3.4.1: Selection of effective relays
1 : Input: Po, Pp, σs, σe, K,Rstarget ,q,Hsp,hss, Hep,hes,Her.
2 : Generate a K × 2K matrix to express all possible combinations of relay selections.
3 : Nr = 1.
4 : begin




6 : Compare R̃scmax (w, Ps) of each combination with Rstarget .
7 : if R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget , exit.
8 : else Nr = Nr + 1.
9 : Repeat steps 5, 6, 7 and 8 until R̃scmax (w, Ps) ≥ Rstarget .
10 : end
11 : Find the number of effective relays, Nr, from the combination.
12 : Output: Nr.
3.4.3 Source Power Optimization
In order to achieve the target secrecy rate at SR with the minimum source power, in this
subsection, we optimize the transmit power of SU under the secrecy rate constraint. Since
Pp (i.e., the power of PU) acts as an interferer for the SR, Pp is assumed to be constant to
optimize the SU’s power, Ps. On the other hand, the secrecy rate at the SR is determined
by the Ps and the jamming power Pr ≥ ‖w‖2. Therefore, for a fixed value of Po, the














− (Pp‖Hep‖2 + σ2e),
w =
√
κv and ‖w‖2 denotes the jamming power.
Substituting the values of κ and w in (3.44), we have





− (Pp‖Hep‖2 + σ2p)‖v‖2, (3.45)
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Pp‖Hsp‖2+σ2 , b4 = 2





≥ τ and ψ(τ,Ps) = (a3P 2s + b4Ps) − τ (a3Ps + c3). Therefore, the














From the solution of (3.46), we get the optimal τ ∗ and P ∗s for minimizing Ps + ‖w‖2.
It should be noted that, in the above analysis, the jamming signal causes an additional
interference at the PR (i.e., ‖Hprw‖2). However, it is possible to eliminate this
interference by designing a suitable precoding vector for the relays as discussed in [25].
3.4.4 Numerical Results
Similar to Section 3.3.4, we used Monte Carol method to statistically test the system
performance. The channel coefficients are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian. The
noises experienced at SR and the eavesdropper are given as σ2s = σ
2
e = 1dBm.
Figure 3.6 shows the secrecy rate at SR as a function of the interference temperature limit
Γm with Po = 40dBm, Pp = 2dBm and the number of relays, K = 10. In the absence of
relays, when both the PU and SU transmit simultaneously, interference causes a reduction
in the secrecy rate at SR as shown in the figure. We see that the secrecy rate Rs can also
be improved by allowing more interference at the PR which limits the transmission power
at the SU and the relays. On the other hand, for a fixed value of Γm, the secrecy rate Rs
is improved by a CJ scheme that creates additional interference at the eavesdropper by
transmitting jamming signals from the relay nodes.
Figure 3.7 shows the impact of total transmission power and the interference temperature
limit on secrecy rate Rs with Pp = 5dBm and K = 5. This figure illustrates that Rs
increases with the rise of the total transmit power Po. Rs is found to increase with the
interference temperature limit Γm up to the value of Po, while it will reach an upper bound
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Interference Temperature Limite Γ  ,
Figure 3.6: The secrecy rate at SR, Rs, as a function of interference constraint Γm with
Po = 40dBm, Pp = 2dBm and K = 10.






































Γ ,Interference Temperature Limit
Figure 3.7: The secrecy rate, Rs as a function of interference constraint Γm for selected
values of Po with Pp = 5dBm and K = 5.
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Interference Temperature Limite Γ  ,
Figure 3.8: The secrecy rate, Rs, as a function of interference constraint Γm for selected
values of Nr with Po = 22dBm and Pp = 2dBm.
for larger value of Γm. As the maximum values of Pr and Ps are limited by Po, allowing
more interference at the PR will not increase the secrecy rate at the SR. Moreover, the
impact of antenna numbers on secrecy rate has been illustrated in Figure 3.8. It shows
that Rs increases with the number of effective relays, while the improvement is more
significant for the scenarios with small number of relays. This is obvious as implementing
more antennas will increase the channel diversity.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we considered the problem of secrecy transmission in the relay-
assisted scheme of a cognitive radio network where the SU can transmit information
simultaneously with the PU. Considering the setup of the cooperative relays, the
approaches of combining CJ with ZF and CJ with relay selection are investigated
separately.
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In the case that there is a cooperative relay with multiple antennas, strategies using CJ
are developed to enhance the security for both full CSI and partial CSI scenarios. In
the full CSI scenario, we proposed a CJ strategy using ZF which will not generate any
interference to PR or SR to increase the secrecy capacity of the cognitive system. The CJ
scheme is also designed using precoding for the legitimate transmission to optimize the
power allocation. In the scenario where channel information regarding the eavesdropper
is unknown, a different CJ scheme which still meets the jamming interference cancelling
target at both PR and SR, is also designed with ZF to enhance the security. Simulation
results show that a combined approach of ZF precoding with CJ scheme is significant in
improving the secrecy rate of cognitive interference channels in both full CSI and partial
CSI scenarios.
For the case that there are multiple relays, we evaluated the performance of a CJ scheme
in enhancing physical layer security of cognitive interference networks with the approach
of relay selection. Multiple relays are used to transmit jamming signals and an algorithm
is developed to select the effective relays which meet the target secrecy rate. Based on our
formulation and from the observation of numerical results, we can conclude that, although
interference due to the PU’s signals deteriorates the secrecy rate of SR, the target secrecy
rate at SR can be achieved by the CJ scheme designed with the developed relay selection
algorithm without increasing the SU’s transmission power.
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Chapter 4
Security of Random Wireless Networks
with Protected Zones
4.1 Introduction
By taking channel propagation effects into consideration, the secrecy capacity of wireless
fading channels was investigated in [9], and expressions of the average secrecy capacity
and the secrecy outage for quasi-static fading channels were derived in [10]. Exact
expression of the secrecy capacity is hard to obtain, due to the limited knowledge of
CSI and path loss in legitimate and eavesdropping channels. Ergodic secrecy capacity,
derived from statistics of CSI and distances which are easier to obtain, can provide a
single letter characterization for the secrecy capacity of an arbitrary wire-tap channel. It
can also provide a helpful reference for the design of networks such as allocating the
transmission power and application of protected zones. The ergodic secrecy capacity of
fading channels without considering path loss was derived independently in [9] and [12].
Previous works of physical layer security primarily focused on point-to-point
transmissions [22, 28, 29]. Recent efforts are to achieve a better understanding of the
inherent secrecy capabilities of wireless systems under more realistic conditions, such
as the distribution of randomly deployed users in large-scale networks. When studying
security in random wireless networks via stochastic-geometric tools [35], the notion of
secrecy graphs emerged in [36]. An important distinction between secrecy graphs and
the conventional point-to-point wire-tap channel is that the topology of networks, with
respect to both the legitimate and eavesdropping nodes, play a major role not only on how
much secrecy rate is available, but also on how to measure it. Following this instinct,
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secrecy rate scaling laws were studied in [37], while the secrecy rates of unicast links in
the presence of multiple eavesdroppers were studied in [38]. Secrecy connectivity over
large-scale network were widely investigated in [35, 36] and [39].
To enhance physical layer security in large-scale networks, various strategies were
investigated, such as guard zones [40, 41], sectorized transmission [42], precoding [43]
and the use of artificial noise [44–46]. Specifically, guard zones were studied in [36]
to improve secrecy connectivity without considering fading, while the study of [40]
investigated how to enhance the secrecy transmission capacity using a guard zone, based
on the assumption of fixed distances between transmitters and the intended receivers.
The concept of secrecy protected zones [45] that extinct the eavesdroppers in the zone
is different from the guard zone that allows the existence of eavesdroppers inside
the protected area. The authors of [45] considered the use of artificial noise and a
secrecy protected zone to enhance the security of random networks, in the presence of
eavesdroppers and interferers randomly deployed according to two homogeneous PPPs.
The study investigated the use of a secrecy protected zone surrounding the transmitter in
order to stop eavesdroppers approaching, while still being affected by interference from
other legitimate transmitters. Analysis in [40] and [45] derived the upper bound of the
secrecy outage probability based on the uniform distribution of eavesdroppers and the
lower bound by the distribution of the nearest eavesdropper, respectively.
In this chapter, we investigate how to enhance physical layer security in random wireless
networks with a secrecy protected zone surrounding the transmitter as well as interferer
protect zones surrounding the legitimate receivers. The impacts of fading, interference
and protected zones are studied in order to analyze the secrecy performance. For large-
scale networks, interference has usually been viewed as a harmful factor. However,
the interference can be well structured by using interferer protected zones to benefit the
secrecy transmission in a similar manner to artificial noise. Notice that, the interference
studied in this work refers to the signals between other transmitters and receivers, rather
than artificial noise introduced additionally as in the work of [40], [98] and [99]. Besides,
the locations of interferers follow a Poisson hole process, due to the existence of the
interferer protected zones. The contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
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• We derive the distribution of channel gains from the transmitter to receivers which
are ordered either according to the distance or their strength. The expression for
the distribution of channel gains is an important tool for calculating the capacity at
the worst-case eavesdropper, which can be applied to derive the secrecy outage, the
probability of secure connection, and the ergodic secrecy capacity.
• The ergodic secrecy capacity of random wireless networks is analyzed by
considering both large scale path loss and small scale fading. Additionally, we
derive the distribution of path loss for the nodes outside the secrecy protected zone.
• Besides the secrecy protected zone, we also employ interferer protected zones
to restructure interference and enhance physical layer security. The distance
distribution of legitimate receivers outside the secrecy protected zone is studied.
• By adopting interferer protected zones at legitimate receivers, interference can be
restructured to benefit the security at the legitimate receiver without introducing
artificial noise. It is worth to notice that interference is different from jamming
noise, because it is the signal broadcasted by other transmitters outside of the
legitimate network. Moreover, the distribution of the active cooperative transmitters
that follow a Poisson-hole process has also been exploited.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system model and mathematical
concepts for stochastic geometry modelling are presented in Section 4.2. In Section
4.3, we study the security in random wireless networks by deriving the distribution for
the composite channel gain. The performance of adopting the protected zones with
and without considering interference are presented in Section 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
The numerical results of secrecy characteristics are discussed in Section 4.6. Finally,
concluding marks are drawn in Section 4.7.
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4.2 System Model
4.2.1 Random Network Model
In this chapter, we consider a wireless network deployed in an unbound two dimensional
space consisting of nodes modeled by a homogeneous PPP with intensity λ and denoted
as Φ. According to the stationarity of PPP, we fix the source node at the origin as the






, k ∈ N be the path loss
process with small scale fading [35], where α is the path loss exponent, rk and hk denote
the distance and the fading coefficient between the source node and kth receiving node,
respectively. Ξ is also a PPP which will be discussed in Section 4.3. Note that {ξk} is not
ordered according to distance {rk} [35], but ordered by the combination of path loss and
fading.
Let the aforementioned model be applied to two overlaid networks of legitimate nodes
and eavesdroppers, respectively, with corresponding densities denoted as λl and λe.
The source node aims to transmit a signal to the kth legitimate receiver in presence of
eavesdroppers located at unknown distances. Both the legitimate and eavesdropping
channels are subject to block ergodic fading and path loss.
Three scenarios are studied in this work. In the first scenario, the basic random network
is studied without a protected zone. While in the second scenario, secrecy protected
zone surrounding the source node is used to enhance security in noise limited networks.
In addition, two cases in which eavesdroppers are aware and unaware of the secrecy
protected zone are investigated. Besides of utilizing a secrecy protected zone, in the
third scenario we analyze the impact of interference restructuring on security by adopting
interferer protected zones.
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4.2.2 Problem Formulation
Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity is the maximum data rate at which the legitimate receiver can
decode the signal information with arbitrarily small error, while the eavesdroppers’ error
probabilities of decoding approach to one. The secrecy capacity of the transmission from






















e denote the transmission power at the source node, the
noise at the legitimate node and the noise at the worst-case eavesdropper, respectively.
Secrecy Outage Probability and Probability of Secure Connection
Secrecy outage probability, known as the outage probability of secrecy capacity under
quasi-static small scale fading, can be given by [10]










where ηl = Pσ2l and ηe =
P
σ2e
. The probability of secure connection is the probability to
have a positive secrecy capacity from the source node to the legitimate receiver [100],
which can be obtained by substitute % = 0 into equation (4.2).
Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The ergodic capacity from the source node to the kth legitimate receiver and the worst-
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The ergodic secrecy capacity can be derived by assuming that the worst-case eavesdropper
can keep achieving the largest channel gain. Consequently, the ergodic capacity of the
worst-case eavesdropper obtained in equation (4.3) is an upper bound. Because of this, a
lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity can be obtained as [46, 102, 103]
Cs:k = [Rs:k −Rs:e]+ . (4.4)
4.3 Security in Random Wireless Networks without
Protected Zone
In this section, we will first derive the PDF of the composite channel gain in the
interference-free scenario without considering protected zone. Afterwards, this PDF
will be used to analyze the distribution of the secrecy capacity, the probability of secure
connection and the ergodic secrecy capacity.
4.3.1 PDF for the Composite Channel Gain
To obtain the distribution of Cl:k for random networks under Nakagami-m fading, we
need to derive the PDF of ξk and ξe. We define the path loss xk = rαk and denote the
intensity of the set Ξ = {xk/hk, k ∈ N} as λΞ. Then the intensity function of Ξ is given
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Given that intensity of Φ is λ and the shape parameter of Nakagami fading is
denoted as m, Ξ is a PPP and the intensity function of Ξ can be expressed by
λΞ(x) = A0x
δ−1, (4.5)
where δ = 2
α




Proof: The point process of Ξ can be obtained from the PPP of Φ = {rk} by a
deterministic mapping and independent displacement. According to the displacement
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Figure 4.1: Random network without protected zone.
theorem and mapping theorem for point process transformations, Ξ is also a PPP [35].




Then, the intensity function λΞ(x) can be obtained by displacement theorem for the
general Nakagami-m fading model by following Theorem 2.33 in [33].






where A1 = A0δ .
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Proof: As Ξ is a PPP, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ξk can be expressed
by
Fξk(s) = P (ξk < s),





























where Ξ[0, s) denotes the counting measure induced by a random circular set of Ξ











By denoting A1 = A0δ and taking the derivative of Fξk(s), we can obtain the PDF for the
composite channel gain as expressed in (4.7).
Note that, the ordering in Theorem 1 is based on the combined effect of path loss and
small-scale fading, which will be used to derive the distribution of the secrecy capacity
and the probability of secure connections in Section 4.3-A, B and C. The investigation
of the legitimate receivers based on the ordering of the combined effect of path loss
and fading can reflect the order of their secrecy capacity and the probability of secure
connection, which is a better indication of how the fading and the point distribution affect
the secrecy of a network. Besides, ordering the legitimate receivers based on the combined
effects can also provide more insights, as the analysis of secrecy capacity at the worst-case
eavesdropper is also based on the combined effect.
Figure 4.2 is the Monte Carlo simulation plotted to compare the PDF for the composite
channel gain derived in (4.7) for various nodes. It shows that the proposed PDF is
accurate, as verified by the simulation.
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Figure 4.2: PDF of ξ from the source node to the 1st, 4th and 8th receivers with λ = 1,
m = 1.5 and α = 4.
4.3.2 Distribution of the Secrecy Capacity
To derive the distribution of the secrecy capacity, we first investigate the distribution of
the capacity at the legitimate receiver. The outage probability of the capacity at the kth
legitimate receiver can be derived by:


































where (a) follows from Theorem 1 and (b) follows [104, Eq. 3.381]. The PDF of the
maximum achievable rate at the kth legitimate receiver can be acquired by taking the
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derivation of Pout (Rk < τ) as follows:















Similarly, the PDF of the maximum achievable rate at the worst-case eavesdropper can be

















Then the distribution of the secrecy capacity at the kth legitimate node can be easily
obtained through the convolution of fRk(τ) for the kth legitimate receiver and the worst-
case eavesdropper similar to the steps used in [39] which ignored the effect of small scale
fading. Note that in this scenario, we derive the PDF of the maximum achievable rate
for the network under Nakagami-m fading. Since the PDF of ξk has already included
the effect of fading, the density function for the composite channel gain of the worst-
case eavesdropper can be calculated briefly by setting k = 1. Otherwise, deriving
the distribution of the channel gain at the worst-case eavesdropper will be formidable
task [38] if considering distribution of fading coefficient and path loss separately. An
approximation of such a distribution has been derived in [38].
4.3.3 Probability of Secure Connection
Probability of secure connection is the probability to have a positive secrecy rate from the
source node to the kth legitimate receiver [100]. It can be derived from the secrecy outage


















By using an algebraic operation similar to the one derived in (4.13) and Theorem 1, the








Security of Random Wireless Networks with Protected Zones
Comparing with the derivation in [39], this result shows that fading does not affect the
probability of secure connection which is determined only by the ratio of intensities.
4.3.4 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity without Protected Zone
In the scenario without the protected zone, the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are
distributed as two independent PPPs with different intensities, λl and λe. It is worth to
notice that the legitimate receivers are ordered by the distance between the source node
and the legitimate receiver, meanwhile the ergodic capacity at the kth legitimate receiver
can be obtained based on Theorem 2. The ergodic capacity at the worst-case eavesdropper
will be derived by applying the distribution of ξe as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The ergodic capacity of the channel between the source node and the kth
















Proof: We denote the distance from the source node to the kth legitimate receiver as
rk, and xk,l = rαk . According to the mapping theorem, the random variable xk,l is also












Security of Random Wireless Networks with Protected Zones
Accordingly, the PDF of the channel gain ζk =
|hk,l|2
xk,l


























sm−1ykδ+m−1 exp(−msy − λlπyδ) dy.
(4.18)












































Note that, when analyzing the ergodic secrecy capacity, the legitimate receivers are
ordered by their distances to the source node. This is different from the ordering based on
the combined effect of path loss and small-scale fading. Since the derivation of the ergodic
secrecy capacity should be based on the communication between the same transmitter-
receiver pair over a period of time, it will be reasonable to order the legitimate receivers
according to their distances to the source node.
For the case of α = 4 and m = 1 which is corresponding to Rayleigh fading, the ergodic
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where G(·) is the Meijer-G function; (a) follows by expressing ln(1 + x) as Meijier G-




 and applying the integration relationship [104, Eq.
7.813.1]; (b) follows from [104, Eq. 7.813.2]. Similarly, by using (4.3) and (4.7), the
ergodic capacity of the channel between the source node and the worst-case eavesdropper























































where (a) follows from α = 4 and [104, Eq. 7.813.2]. Then, substitute (4.15) and (4.21)
into (4.4), the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity at the kth legitimate node in
the random network without a protected zone can be derived.
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4.4 Enhancing Security with Secrecy Protected Zone
To enhance the security of the legitimate transmission, we adopt the scheme of the secrecy
protected zone [98] where the source node can keep a circular area free of eavesdroppers,
denoted as Θ(0, ρt) and ρt is the radius of the secrecy protected zone. Notice that
legitimate nodes are still deployed as a PPP in R2 while eavesdroppers are distributed
as a PPP in Θ̄, where Θ̄ represents the complement set of Θ(0, ρt) in R2. In this chapter,
we will study the case that eavesdroppers are not colluding.
Since the ergodic capacity of the general case in this scenario is complicated to derive, we
will first consider the worst case, i.e., the eavesdroppers try to approach the source node
and stay at the boundary of the secrecy protected zone. In this case, the distance between
the source node and the nearest eavesdropper is the radius of the secrecy protected zone,
ρt. Later in this section, it will be proved that the nearest eavesdropper is the worst-case
eavesdropper since it can acquire the largest ergodic capacity. Furthermore, the scenario
that the eavesdroppers are distributed as a PPP outside the secrecy protected zone will
also be investigated.
4.4.1 Eavesdropper on the Boundary of Secrecy Protected Zone
For the case that eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone, we study the
worst case that the eavesdroppers try to maximize their data rate by approaching the
boundary of the zone. We will first prove that the nearest eavesdropper to the source node
has the largest ergodic capacity in Proposition A and then derive the ergodic capacity at
the worst-case eavesdropper.
Proposition 1. The ergodic capacity Rs:r of the channel between the source node and
the receiving node is monotonically decreasing with their distance r for arbitrary fading
channels.
Proof: See Appendix A.
From Proposition A, we can see that the nearest eavesdropper can obtain the largest
ergodic capacity. Therefore, the worst case is that there will be eavesdroppers on the
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Figure 4.3: Random network with the secrecy protected zone.
boundary of the secrecy protected zone, i.e. re = ρt. By expressing ln(1 + x) as Meijier
G-function and applying the integration relationships [104, Eq. 7.813.1] and [104, Eq.
7.813.2], the ergodic capacity of the channel between the source node and the nearest
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For the case with Nakagami-m fading, the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound at the kth
legitimate receiver with a secrecy protected zone can be obtained by substituting (4.15)


























where (a) follows from that he is Rayleigh fading and its power is exponentially
distributed; (b) follows from [104, Eq. 7.813.1] and Ei is the exponential integral.
4.4.2 Random Eavesdroppers Outside of Secrecy Protected Zone
For the general case, the eavesdroppers may be unaware of the boundary that their
locations are still distributed as a PPP in the field outside the secrecy protected zone.
According to Proposition 1, the worst-case eavesdropper is the nearest eavesdropper
which will obtain the largest ergodic capacity. To calculate the ergodic capacity at the
worst-case eavesdropper, we derive the distribution of its distance from the source node
as shown in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Consider a random network in which the nodes are modeled by a PPP
outside a circular area. The PDF of the distance from the origin to the nth nearest node
is given by





)] [πλ (r2 − ρ2)]n−1
(n− 1)!
, r > ρ, (4.24)
where λ is the intensity and ρ is the radius of the circular area.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The PDF of the distance from the source node to the nth receiving node outside a circular
area in (4.24) has been verified by Monte Carlo simulations in Figure 4.4. When there is
no protected zone, i.e. ρ = 0, the distribution of the distance from the origin to nth node
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Distance from the source node r, (m)







































Figure 4.4: PDF of the distance from the source node to the nth neighbor with λ = 1, ρt =
1; d1, d2 and d4 show the distribution of the distances from the source node to the 1st, 2nd,
and 4th nodes, respectively.
can be obtain from (4.24) as




This is exactly the PDF of the Euclidean distance from the source node to the nth neighbor
provided in [105]. The distribution of the distance from the nearest node to the origin can
be obtained by setting n = 1 in (4.24) as
d1(r) = 2πλr exp[−πλ(r2 − ρ2)], r > ρ. (4.26)
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Notice that, to avoid confusion, we use fre,1(y) to denote the function of d1(r). Similarly,
the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity can be obtained by substituting (4.15)
and (4.27) into (4.4).
4.5 Enhancing Security with both Secrecy and Interferer
Protected Zones
4.5.1 Problem Formulation
In addition to adopting a secrecy protected zone around the source node, we introduce
the interferer protected zones which will contribute to restructuring the interference and
enhance the physical layer security. For the interference limited random network, properly
restructuring the interference can reduce its detriment to the legitimate receivers more
than that of the eavesdroppers. To reduce the interference in the legitimate channels, the
legitimate receivers will broadcast beacon signals with the same power Pb [106]. The
cooperative nodes that have received the beacon signals will stop transmission. Note that
these cooperative nodes are different from those externally introduced jammers in [40],
but similar to secondary transmitters in cognitive radio networks. The legitimate receivers
will formulate another kind of protected zones Φd = {D(x, ρd)|x ∈ Φl}, where D(x, ρd)
is the circular area centered at x with radius ρd and x is the coordinate of the legitimate
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, i ∈ N.
The description of the system model is given as follows and illustrated in Figure 4.5,
• The distribution of the source node and the legitimate receivers are the same as the
previous scenarios in Section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4;
• The cooperative nodes are modeled by a homogeneous PPP with intensity λc;
• To reduce the detriment from the interference, interferer protected zones are
adopted surrounding the legitimate receivers. The legitimate receivers will prevent
cooperative nodes that are located in a nearby region from transmitting signals
inside the interferer protected zones, by adopting the request-to-send/clear-to-send
(RTS/CTS) protocol in IEEE 802.11 [99].
To calculate the ergodic secrecy capacity, we will first derive the distribution of the
aggregate interference and the ergodic capacity at the legitimate receivers and the
eavesdroppers.
4.5.2 Distribution of the Aggregated Interference and Ergodic
Capacity at the Legitimate Receiver
The locations of the active cooperative nodes are depending on the exclusion regions
which are set up by the legitimate receivers. The random set of active cooperative nodes
can be considered as a Poisson hole process [33] with its intensity denoted as λeqc. The
probability of a point retained in the Poisson hole process is the probability that no active
cooperative node exists within the distance r from the legitimate receiver. Consequently,
the intensity of the Poisson hole process is given by












Figure 4.5: Random network with a secrecy protected zone at the source node denoted by
D(0, ρt) and interferer protected zones surrounding the legitimate receivers denoted by
D(x, ρd).
The distribution of the active cooperative nodes is restructured by independent thinning
of the cognitive users outside the exclusion regions. In the following subsection, we will
calculate the distribution of the aggregate interference from the cooperative nodes to the
legitimate receivers based on this approximation.
Interference at the Legitimate Receivers
The point process of the active cooperative nodes is not a PPP but a Poisson hole
process. According to the properties of point process transformation, independent
thinning of the cooperative nodes outside the interference protected zones with probability
of exp(−λlπρ2d) yields a good approximation on Icd [107]. To make the characteristic
of interference more tractable, the interference from the Poisson hole process can be
modeled by a virtual PPP. The parent PPP has to be independently thinned to match the
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density of the PPP with that of Poisson hole process, which affects the local neighborhood
of interferers that surround the legitimate receiver [108]. As a result, the accuracy of the
approximation will reduce when the repulsive distance increases. The approximation
in this research is based on the assumption of small repulsive distance. The aggregate
interference from the cooperative nodes to the legitimate receivers can be obtained by
using equation (3.46) in [109], while the interference in our case is analyzed based on
a virtual PPP with intensity λc exp(−λlπr2). Denote the moment generating function




























where 2F1(·) stands for Hypergeometric function.
Ergodic Capacity at the Legitimate Receivers
















where hi,k denotes the fading coefficient between the ith cooperative node and the kth
legitimate receiver; Ncd denotes the noise at the legitimate receiver. Assuming that the
noise at the legitimate receivers are dominated by the interference, the success probability
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at the kth legitimate receiver can be derived by
Ptd(τ) ≈ P (γs:k > τ) ,















where (a) follows from that of |hk|2 is exponentially distributed and (b) follows from
Laplace transformation. Substitute (4.30) into (4.32), we can obtain the expression of
success probability at the kth legitimate receiver. The CDF of the SIR at the kth legitimate





. Then we derive the PDF of the
SIR from Fγs:k(z) and analyze the ergodic capacity at the kth legitimate receiver as [101].
Assuming that the distance rk is known at the transmitter, the ergodic capacity at the kth





















































The ergodic capacity in (4.33) can be calculated by using numerical methods. Since
deriving the closed-form expression of the ergodic capacity at the kth legitimate receiver
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where (a) follows from γ(a, x) ≤ Γ(a) according to the definition of the lower incomplete














































































where (a) follows by substituting τ with Pr−αk s; (b) follows from (4.34); (c) follows by
defining the PDF of s as fs(x) = a
1/δ
Γ(1+1/δ)
exp(−axδ) and a = πλeqcΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1 − δ);






4.5.3 Distribution of the Aggregated Interference and Ergodic
Capacity at the Worst-Case Eavesdropper
The Interference at the Eavesdroppers
Similarly, the aggregate interference from the cooperative nodes to the eavesdroppers can
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Ergodic Capacity at the Eavesdroppers
Ergodic capacity at the eavesdroppers can be derived following the work of [101].
















where hi,e denotes the fading coefficient from ith cooperative node to the nearest
eavesdropper; Nce denotes the noise at the legitimate receiver. Assuming that the noise
at the eavesdroppers are dominated by the interference, the success probability at the
eavesdroppers is given by













Substitute (4.28) and (4.36) into (4.38), we can obtain the success probability at the
eavesdroppers. The CDF of the SIR at the eavesdroppers can be denoted by
























Considering the security constraint, we study the ergodic capacity at the nearest
eavesdropper which can obtain the maximum ergodic capacity as shown in Proposition 1.
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(1 + τ)(πλ+ beτ δ)
dτ.
(4.41)
Accordingly, the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity at the kth legitimate receiver
can be obtained by substituting (4.35) and (4.41) into (4.4).
4.6 Numerical Results
In Section 4.3 and 4.4, we have simulated the distribution of the composite channel
gain and the PDF of the distance in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4, respectively. In this
section, we will investigate the effect of various factors on the lower bound of the ergodic
secrecy capacity, including the intensity ratio, the radius of the protected zone, path loss,
interference and transmission power.
4.6.1 Probability of Secure Connection in Noise Limited Network
The analytical result for the probability of secure connection in noise limited network is
given in (4.14). It is shown that the probability of secure connection is determined by the
ratio of intensities, i.e., λl/λe, while it is not affected by the channel fading. Intuitively,
this is because that channel fading affect both the legitimate nodes and the eavesdroppers
in the same way, i.e., the fading of the legitimate channels and the eavesdropping channel
have the same distribution.
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Figure 4.6: The ergodic secrecy capacity as a function of the ratio, λl/λe with different
path-loss exponents with λe = 1 and m = 1.
4.6.2 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity in Noise Limited Network
Figure 4.6 illustrates the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity between the source
node and the legitimate receivers without a protected zone. In this scenario, the impact
of path loss and the intensity ratio between the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
is investigated. As shown in Figure 4.6, the lower bound of ergodic secrecy capacity is
monotonically increasing with the increase of the intensity ratio between the legitimate
and eavesdropping nodes. When the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers experience
the same fading and path loss, the ergodic secrecy capacity at all the legitimate receivers
are zero if their intensity is equal to or smaller than the intensity of eavesdroppers, i.e.
λl/λe ≤ 1. An interesting point shown in Figure 4.6 is that increasing the path loss
exponent is beneficial for enhancing the ergodic secrecy capacity which is due to the
difference of their distance to the source under the condition of λl/λe > 1.
Figure 4.7 reveals the impact of adopting a secrecy protected zone surrounding the source
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e = 20, λe = 0.1, α = 4 and ρd = 2.
node to enhance the ergodic secrecy capacity. ρt denotes the radius of the secrecy
protected zone, i.e., there is no eavesdropper in the circular area which is surrounding
the source node with a radius of ρt. As shown in Figure 4.7, for the same intensity
ratio between the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers, increasing the radius of the
protected zone can be helpful to enhance the ergodic secrecy capacity. This is obvious
as increasing the radius of the secrecy protected zone will increase the minimum distance
from source node to the nearest eavesdropper. Compared to the results shown in Figure
4.6 where the ergodic secrecy capacity will be zero if λl/λe ≤ 1, the application of a
protected zone ensures that positive ergodic secrecy capacity can still be achieved even if
λl/λe ≤ 1, for example, λl/λe = 0.5. Another insight gained from Figure 4.7 is that the
increase of ρt has limited impact on the ergodic secrecy capacity. This limitation is the
value of the ergodic capacity at the legitimate receiver, since the ergodic secrecy capacity
cannot be larger than ergodic capacity at the legitimate receiver.
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show the impact of the secrecy protected zone surrounding the
source node, as well as the impact of the intensity ratio on ergodic secrecy capacity. The
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legitimate receiving nodes are ordered by their distances to the source node. As shown
in Figure 4.8, it is clear that, if the radius of the protected zone is zero, i.e., there is no
protected zone, the three scenarios have the same secrecy performance. For different
scenarios with the same value of intensity ratio and protected zone radius, adopting a
protected zone will significantly improve the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity.
When eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone boundary, security will be
undermined, but it can still achieve higher ergodic secrecy capacity comparing to the case
without a protected zone. Figure 4.8 also suggests that increasing the radius of the secrecy
protected zone is helpful to increase ergodic secrecy capacity. Figure 4.9 further indicates
that increasing the intensity ratio between legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers will lead
to a higher ergodic secrecy capacity for all scenarios.
4.6.3 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity in Interference Dominated Network
Figure 4.10 shows the comprehensive impact of the protected zone radius at the legitimate
receivers and the intensity of cooperative nodes. It is apparent that increasing transmission
power at the source node increases the ergodic capacity lower bound at legitimate
receivers. Although increasing the intensity of cooperative nodes undermine the security
performance at legitimate receivers, the adoption of a secrecy protected zone can increase
the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound. In other words, combined with a secrecy
protected zone, using an interferer protected zone in order to restructure interference can
improve the ergodic secrecy capacity lower bound. This is because a larger interferer
protected zone radius, ρd, will reduce interference noise at the legitimate nodes compared
to that at eavesdroppers.
4.7 Summary
In this work, we studied physical layer security in random wireless networks. The PDF of
the channel gains by considering both fading and path loss was considered and a closed
form expression of its reciprocal is derived. This result was then applied to analyze the
probability of secure connection and ergodic secrecy capacity. The ordering of receivers
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Figure 4.8: The impact of the secrecy protected zone size on ergodic secrecy capacity
with Pt/σ2l = Pt/σ
2
e = 20, λl = λe = 0.2, α = 4 and ρd = 2.
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Figure 4.9: The impact of intensity ratio on ergodic secrecy capacity with Pt/σ2l =
Pt/σ
2
e = 20, λe = 0.2, α = 4, ρt = 1 and ρd = 2.
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Transmission power at source node Pt, (dBm)
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Figure 4.10: The impact of the interferer protected zones on ergodic secrecy capacity,
with α = 4, λl = λe = 0.1, ρt = 5 and Pc/σ2l = Pc/σ
2
e = 1.
was based on the composite effect of fading and path loss in deriving the probability of
secure connection, while the ordering of receivers for deriving ergodic secrecy capacity
was based on their path loss. Furthermore, we investigated the scenario with a secrecy
protected zone to enhance physical layer security and the analytical expression of ergodic
secrecy capacity is obtained. Moreover, interferer protected zones surrounding legitimate
receivers are also considered to reduce the detriment from interference.
By employing protected zones, positive ergodic secrecy capacity can be achieved even
if the intensity of the legitimate nodes is smaller than that of the eavesdropping nodes
in random wireless networks. The application of interferer protected zones can make
the interference beneficial to the security of the wireless network. Both the PDFs of
the channel gains and the concept of ergodic secrecy capacity provided in this chapter
can be easily extended to the analysis of other secrecy characteristics in random wireless
networks, such as secrecy outage probability. They can also be extended to investigate
the cases with eavesdroppers colluding and multiple antennas at the source node.
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Chapter 5
Security of Downlink Cellular Networks
with Fractional Frequency Reuse
5.1 Introduction
To incorporate physical layer security into practical usages, recent works extended the
implementation of stochastic geometric tools to cellular networks in [30] and [31]. In
these papers, the locations of the BSs are modeled by homogeneous PPPs to analyze
the average secrecy rate, coverage of secure connection and secrecy outage probability.
Although PPP is a favorable model for the deployment of the BSs due to its tractability,
the locations of the BSs appear to form a more regular pattern since they are repulsive to
each other. Consequently, a better solution is to model the deployment of the BSs as a
more regular point process, such as the HCPP [32]. HCPP is a point process where the
distance between each pair of the points are larger than a certain minimum value [33].
In [34], HCPP was exploited to characterize the secrecy performance, i.e., the secrecy
outage probability of the downlink AWGN channel of the cellular network, by assuming
that the target mobile station (MS) is interference-free.
Related Work
To improve the performance of the cellular network, FFR was proposed as an inter-cell
interference coordination (ICIC) strategy with the absence of an eavesdropper in [110]
and [111]. The basic idea of FFR is to partition the bandwidth of the cell to reduce
interference at the cell users. Another benefit is that FFR can make cell-edge users
free from the interference of the adjacent cells. Similar concept to enhance security is
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the sectorized transmission which was studied in [36], [42] and [112]. The sectorized
transmission was accomplished by transmitting independent signals in several sectors
of the cell by using directional antennas [36]. Based on the strategy of sectorized
transmission, [42] analyzed the effect of adopting multiple antennas to enhance security
in the interference-free scenario. The combination of sectoring and artificial noise was
further analyzed in [112]. The transmitter sends the source information in the sector
where the target user is located, and transmits artificial noise to other sectors. Although
the approach of FFR is similar to that of sectorized transmission as they both partition the
whole cell into separate sectors, FFR requires BSs to transmit with different sub-bands
of the total bandwidth to different sectors. Consequently, from the view of security, FFR
will also contribute towards increasing the secrecy rate by reducing interference at the cell
users, due to the division of frequency bands.
The study in [31] investigated physical layer security in cellular networks by comparing
the approaches of communicating with the nearest BS and the optimum BS, by ignoring
the channel fading and interference. To enhance physical layer security in an ad-hoc
network, the combined effect of artificial noise and sectoring was analyzed in [112],
by using the same frequency for all the sectors. Analysis of secrecy outage probability
in the downlink of cellular networks was studied in [30] by approximating the PDF of
interference.
In comparison, this work considered the repulsive property of the BSs by modeling
the cellular network as a HCPP. The strategy of FFR investigated in this paper is
also distinct from the sectorized transmission due to different characteristics of the
interference. Moreover, the secrecy outage probability studied in this paper is analyzed
by comparing the secrecy capacity with a threshold value, rather than comparing the SIR
at the eavesdropper with a target value [112].
Contributions
The contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
• We derived the approximated distance distribution of HCPP. Further analysis and
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simulation showed that the distance distribution can be approximated with a virtual
PPP, which is applied to investigate the secrecy performance of transmission with
the best BS.
• For the noise-limited cellular network, two transmission schemes are investigated,
i.e., the downlink transmission with and without FFR. For the scheme without FFR,
two transmission strategies are analyzed by selecting different BSs, i.e., the nearest
BS versus the best BS. The distribution of the channel gain from the nearest BS to
the user was obtained by combining the distribution of the small scale fading and
path loss, while the derivation for the distribution of the channel gain from the best
BS was based on exploiting the characteristic of a PPP.
• For the scenario of interference-limited networks, we further study the application
of the FFR to enhance physical layer security in the downlink transmission of
cellular networks. To analyze the secrecy outage probability in the downlink
cellular networks, the PDFs of the SIRs are derived for both the scenarios with
and without using FFR, based on the analysis of the inter-cell interference.
• The statistical characteristics of interference in downlink cellular networks are also
investigated to study the effect of FFR.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the system model and problem
formulation. In Section 5.3, we analyze the security outage probability of the downlink
transmission in noise-limited cellular networks for the following transmission schemes: i)
best BS without FFR; ii) nearest BS without FFR; iii) nearest BS with FFR. The secrecy
outage probability in interference-limited cellular networks are investigated in Section
5.4 for the schemes with and without FFR. Numerical results are presented in Section
5.5. Conclusions and topics of interest for future work are discussed in Section 5.6.
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5.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
5.2.1 Downlink System Model
We consider the downlink of a cellular network where the BSs are deployed according
to the repulsive property, which is thinned from a parent homogeneous PPP Φp with
intensity λp. The parent point process Φp = {(xi,mi); i = 1, 2, 3, ...} is a marked
PPP, where xi denotes the ith point of the process and mi stands for its mark, which
is uniformly distributed in the range [0, 1]. The repulsive point process guarantees the
minimum distance % between any two BSs in the network. In this chapter, we model
this repulsive point process as a Matérn hard-core point process (MHCPP) of type II ΦM
with intensity λM [78]. ΦM is obtained by removing all the points in Φp that have a
neighbor within distance % that has a smaller mark. The cellular network deployment is
shown in Figure 5.1, where rl and re denotes the distance from the transmitting BS to the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. The eavesdroppers are distributed
as an independent PPP, i.e. Φe, with their intensity being denoted as λe. The BSs
are assumed to transmit with the same power P . We consider the security at a typical
legitimate user. We assume that all the BSs transmit with the same power P .
Path Loss Process with Fading
Let ΞM = {ξi,l =
rαi,l
|hi,l|2
, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n} be the path-loss process with fading at the
legitimate user [35], where α is the path loss exponent, ri,l and hi,l denote the distance
and the fading coefficient from the ith BS to the typical legitimate user, respectively.
Consequently, ΞM is also a PPP [35] and its intensity will be discussed in section 5.3.
For the eavesdroppers, the path loss process with fading can be denoted as Ξe = {ξk,e =
rαk,e
|hk,e|2
, k = 1, 2, 3, ..., n}, where rk,e and hk,e denote the distance and fading coefficient
from the serving BS to the kth eavesdropper, respectively.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of a cellular network.
Interference Modeling
The inter-cell interference at the receiver is the sum of the received powers from all other






where P stands for the transmission power at other BSs.








denotes the path loss with fading from the serving BS to the typical
legitimate user and σl represents the noise power at the typical legitimate user. Similarly,













Figure 5.2: Transmission scheme of a Voronoi cell with FFR.
where ri,e and hi,e denote the distance and the fading coefficient from the ith BS
to the worst-case eavesdropper, respectively. We denote the SINR at the worst-case







|he|2 denotes the path loss with fading from the serving BS to the worst-case
eavesdropper and σe represents the noise power at the worst-case eavesdropper.
FFR
In the scenarios with FFR, we assume that each of the Voronoi cell in the cellular network
is partitioned into L sectors and each of the sectors is served by its BS with a sub-
band of the total bandwidth. Accordingly, the frequency reuse factor is L. The set of
interfering base stations are base stations in other Voronoi cells that use the same sub-
band as the receivers, i.e. the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers. To differentiate
from the scheme without FFR, the interference in the cellular network with FFR at the
legitimate user and the worst-case eavesdropper are denoted as Îl and Îe. Figure 5.2
displays the transmission scheme of using FFR in a Voronoi cell from Figure 5.1. The
same transmission scheme is also deployed in other Voronoi cells of the cellular network.
For a typical legitimate receiver, the detriment of its secrecy rate is from eavesdroppers
that communicate using the same sub-band.
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5.2.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a scenario where the serving BS transmits confidential messages to a typical
legitimate user in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. By assuming that
there is no collusion among the eavesdroppers, the secrecy capacity of the transmission
from the serving BS to the legitimate user is given by [8]
Rs =
[
log2(1 + γl)− log2(1 + γe)
]+
. (5.5)
Accordingly, the secrecy outage probability which is also known as the outage probability
of secrecy capacity under slow fading, can be expressed as [10]







where τ is the target secrecy rate. We denote the PDF of γl and γe as fγl and fγe ,































where Fγe is the CDF of γe. Accordingly, the secrecy outage probability of downlink
transmission can be obtained if fγl and Fγe can be derived.
5.3 Secrecy Outage Probability of Noise-Limited
Cellular Networks
In the noise-limited cellular networks, the interference from other BSs can be ignored or
has the same level of power compared to the noise [31]. The analysis in this section are
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organized in two parts. In the first part, the PDFs of the distances from a typical point
u ∈ Rd to the nodes of a HCPP are derived to study the distribution of the BSs. In the
second part, the secrecy outage probabilities of the downlink cellular networks are derived
by investigating two different transmission schemes, i.e., with and without FFR.
To avoid confusion, we denote the SNR at the typical legitimate user and the eavesdropper










5.3.1 Distance Distribution of HCPP
The PDF of the Euclidean distance from a typical point to the nth nearest node of a Matérn
HCPP can be derived using the following theorem.
Theorem 4. In a Matérn HCPP of type II, which is generated from a homogenous PPP
with intensity λp and repulsive distance %, the PDF of the Euclidean distance from a










Proof. See Appendix C.
The PDF of the distance from a typical point to the nth neighbor in a MHCPP in (5.10) has
been verified by Monte Carlo simulations in Figure 5.3. It shows that the approximated
analytical results for small ratios, i.e., ρ ≤ 0.3, match the simulation quite well.
Notice that, the intensity of base stations λp = 3.7 × 10−5 can be assumed for urban
regions [32], while the actual intensity in the rural regions according to the actual locations
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Figure 5.3: The PDF of distance from the typical node to the nth neighbor in HCPP







πλp. The curves from left to right in each of the figures show the PDF
of rn from the typical node to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd nodes, respectively.
of the BSs is about λp = 2 × 10−8. Accordingly, the radius of the average coverage area
is about 100m in the urban regions and around 4000m in the rural regions, which can be
derived by 1/
√
πλp. As % = ρ/
√
πλp, the approximated results can be applied in the
case when the repulsive distance of BSs is less than 30m in urban regions and less than
1200m in rural regions1.
Remarks:
• The distance distribution in (5.10) is derived based on the definition of HCPP, which
is similar to the distance distribution of a PPP. This is because when the repulsive
distance % approaches zero, the HCPP will converge into a PPP. The expression of
distance distribution in (5.10) along with the work of [78] indicate that interference
based performance in Matérn HCPP of type II can be safely approximated with a
1We acknowledge that there are chances that ρ might be larger and lead to more deviation from the
approximation. In that case, the analyze of BS serve in this work might not be effective, while other
strategies still work by simply replacing the distribution of the distance to the nearest point in (5.12) with
some existent results as given in [113]. For interference-based performance analysis, MHCPP of type II
can be safely approximated by the corresponding virtual PPP [78].
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virtual PPP process when the repulsive distance is small.




For 2-dimension spaces, it can be written as
fr1(r) = 2λMπr exp(−λMπr2). (5.12)
5.3.2 Secrecy Outage Probability without FFR
In this subsection, we analyze the secrecy outage probability of the downlink transmission
in two scenarios, i.e., served by the nearest and the best BSs. Selection of the serving BS
according to different criterions are implemented through the cooperation of the BSs by
exchanging the location and identity information of the legitimate users.
Nearest BS
The nearest BS to a legitimate user is in fact the BS of the Voronoi cell where the
user is located, as shown in Figure 5.1. To study the secrecy outage probability of the
downlink transmission, the distributions of channel gains from the nearest BS to the
typical legitimate user and the worst-case eavesdropper will be investigated, respectively.
The secrecy outage probability can be obtained by substituting the PDF of γl and the CDF
of γe into (5.7).
We assume that both the channels from the BS to the legitimate user and the worst-case
eavesdropper are subjected to Rayleigh fading. Denoting the path loss from the nearest
BS to the legitimate user as rαl = xl, the PDF of xl is given by [35]
fxl(x) = πλMδs
δ−1 exp(−λMπsδ), (5.13)
2The contact distance at an arbitrary location u ∈ Rd of a point process Φ is ‖u−Φ‖, i.e., the distance
from u to the nearest point in Φ [33, Def. 2.37].
92
Security of Downlink Cellular Networks with Fractional Frequency Reuse
where δ = d/α. The PDF of the channel gain ζl =
|hl|2
xl



















where f|hl|2, xl(x, y) denotes the joint PDF of |hl|2 and xl, and (a) follows the assumption
that the fading coefficient is independent of the path loss. Correspondingly, the PDF of γ̃l



























According to the definition of secrecy capacity, the SNR at the worst-case eavesdropper
is taken into account to analyze the secrecy outage probability. Note that, in this scenario
the eavesdroppers are trying to interpret the source information from the serving BS.











where Ae = πλe
Γ(δ+m)
mδΓ(m)
includes both the effect of path loss and small scale fading.
The worst-case eavesdropper has the largest channel gain which corresponds to ξ1,e. For
simplicity, we will use ξe to represent the channel gain at the worst-case eavesdropper.







By substituting (5.15) and (5.17) into (5.7), the secrecy outage probability of the
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legitimate user communicating with the nearest BS can be derived as















































For the case of high SNR, the secrecy outage probability of the legitimate user
communicating with the nearest BS can be simplified as




































In this scheme, the legitimate user will be served by the BS from which the user can
get the largest channel gain. Similar to the analysis of the channel gain at the worst-case
eavesdropper, PDF for the path-loss process with fading from the best BS to the legitimate
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where Al = πλlδ
Γ(δ+m)
mδΓ(m)
. The secrecy outage probability of the legitimate user served by
the best BS can be derived by
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Similarly, for the case of high SNR, the approximation of secrecy outage probability of
the legitimate user communicating with the best BS is given by

















































5.3.3 Secrecy Outage Probability with FFR
In the scheme of FFR, the intensity of the path-loss process with fading is reduced by
frequency reuse, which works as independent thinning of the eavesdroppers. The number
of eavesdroppers in each sector is 1/L of the total number in the cell, i.e., the intensity
measure of each sector is reduced by L. Accordingly, the parameter Ae as given in (5.16)
will also be affected by the frequency reuse. To avoid confusion, we denote the value of
Ae in the scheme of FFR as Âe, then Âe = AeL . The legitimate users in each sector of the
Voronoi cells are allocated a common subband, ∆x, of the total bandwidth transmitted
from the BS. To analyze the effect of implementing FFR, the legitimate user is assumed
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to be located at a distance of r0 from its nearest BS. The secrecy outage probability at the
legitimate user served with the strategy of FFR can be derived by































For the case of high SNR, the secrecy outage probability at the legitimate user served by
the strategy of FFR can be simplified as























The expression in (5.24) is similar to that in (5.19), and only the parameter Âe is affected
by FFR due to the change of intensity.
5.4 Secrecy Outage Probability of Interference-Limited
Cellular Networks
In this section, we analyze the scenarios in the interference-limited cellular networks
where interference has a much larger impact than the noise power on the values of γl
and γe. Similar to the structure of the previous section, the analysis of the secrecy
outage probability in interference-limited cellular networks is also categorized in two
subsections, i.e., secure transmission without and with FFR.
5.4.1 Secrecy Outage Probability without FFR
To analyze the improvements of incorporating FFR, we will first derive the CDF of SIR at
the legitimate user and the worst-case eavesdropper. The CDF of SINR at the legitimate
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user can be derived by
Fγl(β) = 1− P [γl > β] ,













The value of P [γl > β] is also equivalent to the coverage probability as analyzed in [114].
The expression for the coverage probability of the legitimate user for a fixed value of rl,
P(|hl|2 > βrαl (σ2 + Il)|rl), can be derived based on the expectation of Il and given by






















































where (a) follows from the fact that the channels are subjected to Rayleigh fading, (b)
follows from applying the probability generating functional (PGFL) [115], (c) follows
from replacing x with vr and (d) follows from considering α = 4 which is the path-loss
exponent value for the suburban area [116]. Substituting (5.26) into (5.25), the CDF of γl
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Accordingly, the outage probability at the typical legitimate user can be directly obtained
as















Assuming that the legitimate user is at a distance r0 from the nearest BS, for the case of
α = 4 and the noise is dominated by the interference, the probability of P (γl > β) can
be derived by




































Similarly, the CDF of γe in cellular networks without FFR can be written as















where fr1,e(r) is the PDF of the contact distance in the PPP of the eavesdroppers, given
by [105] as
fre(r) = 2λeπr exp(−λeπr2). (5.32)
Secrecy outage probability of the downlink cellular network without FFR can be derived
by substituting fγl(β) and Fγe(β) into (5.7).
5.4.2 Secrecy Outage Probability with FFR
By implementing FFR, the interference at each of the receivers in the cellular network
will be reduced, since only the interference that are transmitted at the same subband will
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affect the SIRs at the receivers. The SIRs, γl and γe, are analyzed and applied to derive
the secrecy outage probability of downlink cellular networks.
To analyze the secrecy outage probability Pout, we need to derive the expression of fγl(β)
and Fγe(β). The CDF of γl is given by Theorem 5 as follows.
Theorem 5. In the downlink transmission of cellular networks using FFR under Rayleigh

















Proof. See Appendix C.
Remarks:












































where erf(x) is the error function of x.
• For the case of α = 4 and at high SIR regime, the closed form expression of Fγl(β)










































• When the distance from the serving BS to the legitimate user is given, the PDF of
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Consequently, the secrecy outage probability in downlink cellular networks with FFR can
be obtained by substituting the distribution functions of γl and γe into (5.7).
5.5 Numerical Results
In this section, the numerical results are presented to show the interplay of different
system parameters and their effects on the security of downlink cellular networks. The
numerical results are grouped into two parts in correspondence to the derivations in
Section 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Numerical results shown in this chapter are based
on Monte Carlo simulations using 100000 independent iterations. All the channel
coefficients are assumed to be i.i.d Rayleigh faded. The transmit power set at the BSs
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is 20 dBm and the path-loss exponent is 4.
5.5.1 Secrecy Outage Probability of Noise-Limited Cellular
Networks
For the scenario of the noise-limited cellular network, the secrecy outage probabilities of
the downlink transmissions from the best and nearest BSs are plotted in Figure 5.4. The
analytical results are verified by Monte Carlo simulations. It is obvious that the secrecy
outage probability is worse when the intensity of the eavesdroppers λe is higher. The
increase of λe will reduce the expected distance from the transmitting BS to the worst-
case eavesdropper, which will accordingly decrease the SNR of the eavesdropper, i.e., γe.
Figure 5.4 indicates that the strategy of transmitting with the best BS is always helpful
to improve the secrecy outage probability. However, the improvement is less beneficial
when λe is higher. It is because that the increase of λe reduces the expectation of the
distance from the BS to the worst-case eavesdropper.
Figure 5.5 studies the secrecy outage probability of the downlink cellular networks using
FFR based on different frequency reuse factors. It shows that in the noise-limited
cellular networks, the use of FFR can improve the secrecy outage probability significantly,
especially when the number of frequency reuse factor is large. This is due to the
application of frequency reuse which helps to reduce λe with an equivalent effect of
independent thinning.
5.5.2 Secrecy Outage Probability of Interference-Limited Cellular
Networks
From Figure 5.6 to Figure 5.9, we investigate the scenarios in interference-limited cellular
networks. The impacts of various factors are studied, such as the number of frequency
reuse factor (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.9), the repulsive distance of the BSs (Figure 5.7),
the ratio of intensities between the BSs and the eavesdroppers (Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8).
The coverage probability plotted in Figure 5.6 is the probability that a typical mobile user
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Target secrecy rate τ, (bit/s/Hz)








































Figure 5.4: Secrecy outage probability with the best BS vs the nearest BS with λp = 0.1
and % = 1.
Target secrecy rate τ, (bit/s/Hz)





































Figure 5.5: Secrecy outage probability with and without FFR, with λp = 0.1 and % = 1.
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Threshold SINR, (dB)














































L = { 1, 3, 5, 8 }
Figure 5.6: Coverage probability at the legitimate user with λp = 0.1 and % = 1.
can achieve the SINR threshold. Figure 5.6 shows that increasing the frequency reuse
factor can help to improve the coverage probability at the legitimate node. This is because
the interference from other BSs is reduced by frequency reuse.
To analyze the impact of the repulsive distance in a MHCPP process, the secrecy outage
probability is plotted as a function of intensity of the parent point process λp and the
repulsive distance between two BSs % in Figure 5.7. Specially, when the repulsive
distance is zero, i.e., % = 0, the curves represent the results of the cellular network
where the deployment of the BSs follows PPP, while other curves illustrate the results
of the networks with the deployment of the BSs that distributed as HCPP. It shows that
increasing the repulsive distance lead to the rise of the secrecy outage probability, since
the expansion of the repulsive region reduces the actual intensity of the BSs λM , which
increases the expectation of the contact distance between the legitimate user and the target
BS accordingly. Figure 5.7 shows that, although the increase of λp reduces the secrecy
outage probability, the improvement will decrease when λp is large. It is because that the
maximum λM is limited by the repulsive distance of the MHCPP.
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Parent base station density, λ
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L = 1, ̺ = 0
L = 4, ̺ = 0
L = 4, ̺ = 0.5
L = 4, ̺ = 1
L = 4, ̺ = 1.5
Figure 5.7: Secrecy outage probability as a function of λp with λe = 0.05.
In Figure 5.8, we investigate the effect of the intensity of the eavesdroppers λe on the
secrecy outage probability of the downlink transmission when the intensity of the BSs is
fixed. Comparing the cases of L = 1 and L = 4 with the same intensity ratio, Figure
5.8 shows that the application of FFR can significantly improve the security performance.
With the same frequency reuse factor, i.e., L = 4, the scenarios with higher ratios of
λM/λe have smaller secrecy outage probability. This can be explained by the following
reasons. Considering the fixed intensity of BSs, the expectation of the distance from an
arbitrary BS to its nearest eavesdropper will reduce when the intensity of eavesdroppers
decreases, while the expectation of the distance between the transmission BS and the
legitimate user is not changed. Accordingly, increasing the ratio of λM/λe leads to the
decrease in γe and the reduction of the secrecy outage probability.
The impact of the frequency reuse number on secrecy outage probability in interference-
limited cellular networks is studied in Figure 5.9. It shows that the increase of the
frequency reuse factor will reduce the secrecy outage probability. Meanwhile, the
improvement of secrecy outage probability at small fractional reuse numbers, e.g. from
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of secrecy outage probability with different ratios between the
BS and eavesdroppers, with λp = 0.1 and % = 1.
L = 1 to L = 4, is more significant than the improvement achieved at large reuse
factors, e.g. from L = 4 to L = 8. The implementation of FFR can help to separate the
eavesdroppers into different sectors and accordingly reduce the expectation of the SNR at
the nearest eavesdropper. As a result, the utility of FFR will decrease the secrecy outage
probability at the legitimate receiver. However, when the reuse factor is raised to high
level, the secrecy rate will mainly be limited by the capacity of the legitimate channel.
5.6 Summary
In this work, we studied physical layer security in the downlink transmission of cellular
networks. To analyze the repulsive property among BSs, the cellar network was modeled
by a MHCPP, and the PDF of the distance distribution in MHCPP was also derived. By
comparing the schemes with and without FFR, the impact of frequency reuse on secrecy
outage probability in two scenarios, i.e. the noise-limited networks and the interference-
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Figure 5.9: Secrecy outage probability of legitimate users with λp = 0.1, % = 1 and
λe = 0.01.
limited networks, were investigated, respectively. For the noise-limited network, we
derived the secrecy outage probabilities of two transmission strategies, i.e. the best BS
serve and the nearest BS serve.
Numerical results revealed that the application of FFR is beneficial for physical layer
security in downlink cellular networks. Although increasing the frequency reuse factor
contributes to enhance the security, the improvements will be less significant when the
number of frequency reuse factor is large. Besides, the strategies of transmitting with the
best BS, increasing the intensity of BSs, and reducing the repulsive distance of the BSs
are helpful to improve the secrecy performance in downlink cellular network.
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Conclusions and Future Work
This final chapter summarizes the contributions of the thesis and suggests several
directions for future work. Motivated by recent developments in wireless communication,
this thesis aims at a characterization of the secrecy performances in several types of typical
wireless networks. Advanced techniques are designed and evaluated to enhance physical
layer security in these networks with realistic assumptions, such as signal propagation
loss, random node distribution and non-instantaneous CSI.
In the remainder of this chapter, more specific conclusions from this thesis are provided
in the first section. Then, by acknowledging shortcomings and limitations, some possible
directions to extend the thesis are discussed.
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis has adopted some important perspectives of physical layer security to
investigate confidential communication in various wireless networks. These perspectives
include secrecy capacity, secrecy connectivity, ergodic secrecy capacity and secrecy
outage probability. The analysis focused on the impact of fading, path loss, cooperative
jamming and interference on the secrecy capacity. The overall contributions and
observations of this thesis can be summarized as follows.
In Chapter 3, secret communication through relay-assisted cognitive interference channel
was investigated. Two CJ schemes were proposed to improve the secrecy rate of cognitive
interference channels depending on the structure of cooperative relays.
• For the network with a relay equipped with multiple antennas, the first CJ
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scheme was developed to increase the secrecy rate of both primary and secondary
transmissions by combining CJ with beamforming. In this scheme, two precoding
strategies were proposed to obtain optimum secrecy rate for the scenarios with full
CSI and partial CSI, respectively. An algorithm was designed to choose the CJ
precoding vector. The introduced jamming noise only degraded the SINRs of the
primary and secondary signal at the eavesdropper, while keeping both the SINRs
of the primary and secondary receiver unaffected. The secrecy rate of the scheme
using CJ with ZF only to the secondary receiver is larger than direct transmission,
while smaller than the scheme using a well-designed CJ scheme with ZF to both
primary and secondary receivers. Even when the CSI of the eavesdropper is
unknown, CJ still can be adopted to increase the secrecy rate at secondary receiver.
• In a scheme with multiple relays transmitting weighted jamming signals, the
combined approach of CJ and relay selection was analyzed. A selection algorithm
was developed to find effective relays to meet the target secrecy rate at SR. The
secrecy capacity can be improved by the CJ scheme creating additional interference
at the eavesdropper with the jamming signals from the relays. Moreover, the secrecy
rate increased with the number of effective relays. The problem of minimizing the
secondary transmit power with a target secrecy rate was also analyzed.
To investigate the impact of the path loss, in Chapter 4, the focus shifted to physical layer
security in a random wireless network where both legitimate and eavesdropping nodes
were randomly distributed. Three scenarios were analyzed to investigate the impact of
various factors on security.
• In scenario one, the random network without protected zone and interference was
studied. The PDF of channel gain with both fading and path loss was derived
and further applied to calculate secrecy connectivity and ergodic secrecy capacity.
This expression for the distribution of channel gains simplified the derivation of the
capacity at the worst-case eavesdropper.
• Secondly, the protected zone surrounding the source node, i.e., the secrecy
protected zone, was investigated to enhance security, where interference is absent.
The distance distribution of receivers outside the secrecy protected zone was
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studied. The ergodic secrecy capacity of random wireless networks was derived
by taking both large-scale path loss and small-scale fading into consideration. Both
the cases of eavesdroppers being aware and unaware of the protected zone boundary
were investigated. The closed form of the ergodic secrecy capacity was given for the
case of α = 4. The simulation showed that, increasing the intensity ratio (λl/λe),
the path-loss exponent and the radius of the secrecy protected zone can be helpful to
enhance the ergodic secrecy capacity. Adopting a protected zone will significantly
improve the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity, even when λl < λe. When
eavesdroppers are aware of the secrecy protected zone boundary, security will be
undermined, but it can still achieve a higher ergodic secrecy capacity compared to
the case without a protected zone.
• Further deployment of protected zones at legitimate receivers, i.e., interference
protected zones, was explored to convert detriment from interference into beneficial
factors. By adopting interferer protected zones, interference was restructured
to benefit the security of the legitimate receivers, similar to the effect of CJ.
Moreover, the distribution of the active cooperative transmitters that follow a
Poisson-hole process was also exploited. The numerical results indicated that,
although increasing the intensity of cooperative nodes would undermine the secrecy
capacity at legitimate receivers, the application of interferer protected zones can
make interference beneficial to the security of the wireless network. The interferer
protected zone contributed to restructuring interference which caused less detriment
to the legitimate receivers than to the eavesdroppers.
Chapter 5 further considered the repulsive properties of wireless networks by analyzing
physical layer security in the downlink transmission of cellular networks. The BSs in
the cellular network was assumed to follow the Matérn HCPP, while the eavesdroppers
were deployed as an independent PPP. The PDF of the distances from a typical point to
the nodes of the HCPP was derived. The noise-limited and interference-limited cellular
networks were investigated, separately, by applying the strategy of FFR.
• For the noise-limited cellular network, two transmission schemes were investigated:
the downlink transmission with and without FFR. For the scheme without FFR, two
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transmission strategies were analyzed by selecting different BSs, i.e., the nearest BS
versus the best BS. The distribution of the channel gain from the nearest BS to the
user was obtained by combining the distribution of the small-scale fading and path
loss, while the derivation for the distribution of the channel gain from the best BS
is based on exploiting the characteristic of PPP. Although communication with the
best BS can always help to reduce the secrecy outage probability, the discrepancy
between the two strategies is reduced when the intensity ratio between the BSs and
the eavesdroppers is increased.
• For the scenario of interference-limited networks, the application of the FFR was
also explored to enhance the security in the downlink transmission of cellular
networks. To analyze the secrecy outage probability in the downlink cellular
networks, the PDFs of the SIR were derived for both the scenarios with and without
using FFR, based on the analysis of the inter-cell interference. The first moment
measure of interference in downlink cellular networks was also investigated to study
the effect of FFR.
The simulations revealed that for both these two scenarios above, the application of FFR
is beneficial for physical layer security in downlink cellular networks, especially by using
large frequency reuse number. However, the improvement of secrecy outage probability
at small fractional reuse numbers was more significant than the improvement achieved at
large reuse factors. Besides, increasing the intensity of BSs and reducing the repulsive
distance of the BSs can help to improve the secrecy performance in downlink cellular
network.
6.2 Future Work
For more practical usage of security in wireless networks, the application will lead to the
consideration of more conservative adversaries; i.e., eavesdroppers might be active rather
than passive and colluding to maximize their received signal powers. Besides, many
promising research topics of physical layer security have emerged in recent years. The
remainder of this section contains some interesting future research directions of physical
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layer security that can make our work more general and practically appealing.
6.2.1 Further Exploitation of the Eavesdropper Strategies
As assumed in most of the literature and this thesis, eavesdroppers are usually supposed
to be passive and act independently [117]. Accordingly, these models still need more
extension on the assumption to solidify the adversary model, such as considering active
eavesdroppers and their mutual collaboration.
Active Eavesdroppers
Most of the existing works on physical layer security have assumed the theoretical
setup with passive eavesdroppers only. However, the eavesdroppers can launch various
active attacks to enhance their eavesdropping performance [118]. These adversaries may
eavesdrop, manipulate, inject, alter, duplicate, and reroute to benefit their purpose. In
particular, by manipulating the environment, it is possible to bias the resulting bits in the
key establishment process [119]. Another active attack, called pilot contamination attack,
has been studied in [120]. In a pilot contamination attack, the eavesdropper attacks the
channel training phase by injecting a virtue pilot to make the precoding beneficial to
the eavesdropping channel. Several approaches have been proposed to resolve this sort
of active attack [121]. Considering the various possibilities of different active attacks,
such as a deceiving attack from the relay, more conservative secrecy schemes need to be
proposed to overcome the weak assumption. Investigation of the physical layer security
to ensure the legitimate transmission robust to adversarial attacks from more intelligent
eavesdroppers will be a new avenue for further research.
Eavesdropper Colluding
For simplicity, eavesdroppers are usually assumed to be separated from each other and
cannot exchange information. In fact, since cooperation is usually used by legitimate
nodes, it must also be assumed that the same strategy can be exploited by intruders as
well. The number of articles considering the impact of eavesdropper collusion in random
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networks is comparatively small, while the issue has been occasionally considered. For
instance, the secrecy capacity in random wireless networks with the presence of colluding
eavesdroppers under an AWGN channel model was studied in [36], and the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity with multiple antenna transmission schemes in Rayleigh
fading channels was analyzed in [100]. If eavesdroppers could employ collaborative
processing, the probability that the combined effect of the eavesdropping channel better
than the legitimate channel will go up quite rapidly [122]. Understanding the implications
of collusion or collaboration on physical layer security will be important to solidify the
adversary model.
6.2.2 Further Exploitation of Promising Networks and Techniques
Although there are many constraints that limit the practical application of physical layer
security, recent advances in wireless communication have offered more technics for its
practical implementation.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)
Wireless sensor nodes are resource-constrained miniature devices limited by processing
speed, storage capacity, and energy reservation [123]. Due to the huge demand for
memory and energy, the widely utilized encryption algorithms cannot be employed to
secure wireless sensor nodes. One promising direction is to develop physical layer
security, which exploits wireless channel characteristics such as noise without the reliance
on secret key exchange or generation. Accordingly, many characteristics and properties
of the security in sensor networks can be derived based on the traditional secrecy models.
The approach of CJ can be employed to enhance the security and optimize the energy
efficiency. Other extensions can address a variety of issues such as designing more
efficient secrecy achieving codes that are of low complexity, and investigating various
propagation environments.
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Internet of Thing (IoT)
The Internet of Things (IoT) is inherently a massive network of machine-type
communication (MTC) devices. A significant portion of the IoT will be low-end, low-
energy, and lightweight computing devices [122]. For these low end devices, most of
their available resources must be devoted to executing core application functionality,
and there may be little left over for supporting security. As a result, robust physical-
layer security methods that can supplement or even replace lightweight cryptographic
protocols are appealing solutions. Low-complexity secrecy schemes tailored for visible
light communications (VLC) [124], acoustic and molecular communication channels
remain largely open problems. Due to the practical constraints of IoT, many existing
signal processing approaches for security will be challenged due to the availability of
channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). Investigating approaches such as
ciphers or encoding for physical layer confidentiality that are efficient and have little to no
message expansion is a promising direction that would greatly benefit IoT devices [125].
However, analysis of the energy-secrecy tradeoff among such MTC devices is still open
to be solved.
Cross Layer Design
The security of communication networks has traditionally relied on cryptographic
schemes in upper layers, albeit with the absence of the physical layer. Therefore, cross-
layer analysis of secrecy to combine physical layer security and cryptographic schemes in
wireless networks is another interesting research area. A cross-layer design may deploy
the encryption approach for security in different layers [126]: at the application layer
(e.g., secure shell (SSH) and secure sockets layer (SSL) for the end-to-end encryption),
at the network layer (e.g., the IPSec protocol for the end-to-end encryption), at the data
link layer and the physical layer (e.g., IEEE 802.11 wireless networks). To find such
a combination approach, it is important to investigate how the physical layer security
and traditional cryptographic approaches interact with each other to enhance the security
of the system. Another research challenge is to define a totally new security metric
that can measure the comprehensive property of information-theoretic and cryptographic
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approaches [127], which might lead to a more efficient encryption scheme.
Full Duplex (FD)
Recently, a number of encouraging FD designs have been proposed to overcome the
self-interference problem using novel combinations of antenna, analogue, and digital
cancellations [128]. These FD designs allow the simultaneous transmission and reception
over the same frequency band impractical. To overcome the defects of cooperator
mobility, synchronization and trustworthiness in traditional jamming approaches which
rely on the external helper, the authors in [129] considered using FD jamming. In the
FD jamming scheme, the legitimate receiver can receive the signal from the source and
simultaneously transmit jamming signals. It was shown that the wire-tap channel with
the FD jamming achieves a better secrecy performance than the classic one with HD in
terms of the outage secrecy region. Later, the networks with multi-antenna techniques and
cooperative relays were also adopted to further boost the potential benefits of using the
FD jamming in [130–132]. Although some more research about the scheme of using FD
to enhance physical layer security turned up recently, the analysis of FD in the large-scale
wireless networks, such as WSN and IoT, are still promising directions to extend.
6.2.3 Other Future Directions
Recently, many compelling topics have attracted the community, as can be found in the
increase of the literature. Some more topics such as interference mitigation, machine
learning, massive MIMO and LiFi can also provide the research potentials for the practical
usage of physical layer security.
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Proof of Proposition A
Proof: The ergodic capacity Rs:r of a general fading channel with the PDF of the fading













































For any fading channel, PDF f|h|2(x) ≥ 0 always hold. It is apparent that, as x ≥ 0, η ≥ 0





f|h|2(x) dx ≥ 0. (A.3)
Then we have ∂Rs:r
∂r




Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: To derive the distribution of the distance from the origin to the nth node outside the
secrecy protected zone, we first investigate the intensity function of the node at a distance
r(r > 0) from the origin. Then the CDF and PDF of the distance from the nth node to the
origin will be computed based on this intensity function. As the nodes outside the secrecy
protected zone are distributed as a PPP, according to the mapping theory, the intensity
measure and intensity function can be separately expressed by
Λopz =

πλ(r2 − ρ2) if r > ρ,





2λπr if r > ρ,
0 if r ≤ ρ.
(B.2)
Since the locations of the nodes outside the secrecy protected zone can still be modeled
by a PPP, the probability of k nodes located in the annual region Aρ:r with internal radius
ρ and external radius r can be calculated by




















Proof of Theorem 3
The CDF of the distance Dn(r) from the origin to the nth nearest node can be computed
by








By taking the derivation of (B.4), the PDF of the distance from the origin to the nth node
outside the secrecy protected zone with radius ρ can be obtained as (4.24).
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Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. For a Matérn HCPP of type II, which is generated from a homogenous PPP, Φp,



















Denoting the CDF of the distance from a typical node x to its nth nearest node of the
Matérn HCPP as Frn(x), we have




P [NM(B(x, r)) = k] ,
(C.3)
where B(x, r) denotes a circular region surrounding the node at x with radius r and
NM(B(x, r)) represents the number of the nodes from ΦM which are located in B(x, r).
According to the definition of Matérn HCPP of type II which is generated from a PPP,
given that the number of nodes in B(x, r) is denoted by m, the probability of retaining
k(m ≤ k) points is equivalent to eliminating m − k points. The probability of k nodes
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located in B(x, r) can be derived by





































where (a) follows from that for % small enough, P[k points are eliminated] ≈ (1 − p)k
[133]. By substituting (C.4) into (C.3), the CDF of the distance from a typical node x to














By taking the derivative of (C.5), the PDF of distance rn is given by (5.10).
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CDF of γl with FFR




















Due to the implementation of FFR in the cellular networks, the approach of deriving the
Laplace transform of Il in [109] cannot be applied to (D.1). Instead, the expression (I) can
be derived by
























CDF of γl with FFR
For a discrete function g(x), its expectation can be derived by E[g(x)] =∑
k g(xk)PX(xk) [134]. Accordingly, we have
E∆i,l
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exp(−βrαhi,lr−αi,l )E∆ [1(∆l = ∆i)] ,
=(L− 1)1− E∆ [1(∆l = ∆i)]
L− 1
+ exp(−βrαhi,lr−αi,l )E∆ [1(∆l = ∆i)] ,












where (a) follows from that
E∆ [1(∆l = ∆i)] =
L∑
i=1








1(∆l = ∆i)P∆ [1(∆l = ∆i)|i = l] ,































CDF of γl with FFR
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